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During the Plenary Session of 15 December 1982, the E\rropean parlianent
refenred the I'lrtion for a Resolution of !tr. SEEER and others on the Conrngrity's
o<ternar trade and the probrenr of globar financial instabirity (poc. t-t023/gzl
to the Cqrmittee qt Drternal Econonic Relations as the crnnittee respcrsible
and to the Cqnnittee on EcancnLic and lbnetary Affairs for an opinion.
orr 19 January 1983 the Ccnntittee on Ecternal Ecmnic Relations
appohted Sir Eled $ABSIER rapporteur.
It consider.ed this lrlrtim for a Resolution at its meetings of
27 Septeflber 1983, 22 February 1984 and 28 Febnrary 1984.
At the latter neeting the @rmittee unanirously a@ted the lbticn for
a Resolution and the Splanatory Statenent with 6 abstentiqrs.
Present : Sir Fred CAIIIERIffD, Chairnran; !trs. }{IEZOREK-ZEIL, Vice-
Chairman; Sir Fred gnRNER, Rapporteuri !,!rs. EADTEL GInRIOSO, Ittr. EUttrt{ENEELD,
!,1r. HARMAR-NICIOLLS (@utizing for !lr. P.@PEB,), E. JOIIKER, Ir{r. PELIKBN,
I,rr. PESlrlAZAGlOt, I,lrs. PRIJ\OI, lllr. RIreB, !rlr. RIVIBEZ, ttrS. SEIHrr.-EfiEnLItG
(deputizing for !{r. SEE[,ER), Ir{r. SPEXiICER, Sir Jotrn SIEI{ART-CI.JIRI( and !r!r. zIAGAs.
llo Qinion ttas been receirred frcnr the Ccnrnittee qr Ecrnonic and trtlnetary
Affairs.
The report ras submitted on 7 itarch 19E4.
The deadtine for the tabling of anendments to this report appears in the
draft agenda for the part-session at uhich it yiLL be debated.
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AIhe Ccrgrdttee ql Ecternel Econcnic Relations hereby suhnits to the gurcPeart
parliaent the foltelirrg mtian for a resolution wit}t elplanatony statmnt:
!,OTION FOR A RESOI,TITICbI
on the Ccarrunity's erEternal trade and the problem of gldal financial instability
Ttre Eurean Parliacnt,
- tnving regard to tle notion for a resolution tabled by ltr Seeler, t'lr Radol(
and !r!r FeIiJGn pursu:mt to RuIe 41 of the Rrles of Preedrre on the erternal
tra& of tlp Cmunity and the problanr of gl&al financial instability
(ooc. L-L1?3/A\ i
- having regard to the Comm,rnication from the Commission of the EC to the Councit
on financiaL integration in the Conmunity (Doc. 1-231/83);
- having revierred tte rnnerqrs resolutions and r@rts adopted on thcse urd
allied matters drrirg ttp life of the present parliarcnti
- having regard to the report of tJrc Ccnmitte on Etternal Ecwrric Relatiqrs
(Doc. 1-1542/83),
A. Believing that reneraed prosperity and econcndc Aro*ttr within the @rrunity.,
full enployrrcnt, an inproved standard of living for the pecples of Eurcpe
and better internatiqral understanding and cooperation are all dependent
on a ren€$Ed increase in *orld trade;
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B. Convinced that international financLal lnstablllty, as
evidenced by wide and uncontrolled fluctuations in
exchange rates and by the crlsis ln ltquldity and
banking problems, ls an obstacle to the developrnent
of worrd trade and a threat to the welfare of lndrvldual
countrles and the Lnternatlonal communlty a8 a whole;
C. Believing that neny of the pressures on ttre GATI systerr stenr frcrn
ttp break&Trn of nrany of the internatiqrat arran{F!rcnts of the post-tlar
eoondoic settl.er6nt;
D. Noting the difficulties posed for the financing of international tra&
by the vorldrs current liquidity and banking problans; '
E. Concerned by the prospect of countries engaging in ocrpetitive
devaluatiqr to gain trade advantages and by the protectionist problans
associated with a rtraak US &llar and a strong Japanese )en;
F. UeLcooing the modrst agreement achieveci at the
VersaiLtes and hlitLiamsburg Summits but uishing to
see a more effective attempt to mcve out of the
present recession;
I.
As regards Exchange Rate' Ihgtabtlltv
l. (a) Given the contlnulng dLvergence of the econonLes of
+, leadlng lndustrlal countrles, a return to a systen of
fixed exchange rates l.s at present nelther financlarry
possible nor polltlcally feaslble.
(b) NcvcrtheLess, a f toating system does not mean that eith".l..*"na
or ride fluctuations in currency vatues have to be accepted.
-6- PEEE.17Blfin
G' suctr flrrctuatims distracting of nranaEemht tlfiE crrd etfcrbr
discouragirrgtoe,Portactivitiesarrdtoinvestrrrgntandheve
as6
d dwffimffig
effect qr tPrld tra&'
(d) Currency lnstabLllty encourages deflands fof, prdte6t{6ni3il
or comPetltlve devirluation ln count'rles wlth hl,ghtvals*
currencies or which are othenill.se uncompgtlttve' ilhe
parllament strongly condemns such threate to r'6rid ttr&r
(e) Non-intervcntion in foreign exchange herhtts l3 hO nof€ ncutrtt
thaninttrventionithereisanredforafrtshrcviergfthe
possibititiesforl.initedjointintcrventiongasashort-tef[
contributiontothestabitizationofexchengCfctesl
(f) Progress towards convergence ln
Lndustriallzed countrLes should
policY alone but should lnclude
the economles of the
1 
..
not be based on monell-EtPPIY
excharnge rate targeta.
(g) The acceptance by the us Governrnent of Iarge budgetarY
and trade defleits, comPensated by very h19h lnterest
rates,hasdamagedbothtradeandlnvcstmentlnthe
communlty and tended to deley wprld economlc recovetY'
-, - PE ElttfElti'n.
2. The Parllament therefore:-
(1)WelcomeEthedeclslonattheVersalllessummlt,
relnforcedatt{tltlamsburg,thatFlnaneeMtnlsters
should study these Problems'
(ii)CallsforanaccelerationoftheworkoftheFl,nancc
MinisterslDeputlesandfortheearlypresentation
by them of proposals. for greateii stablllty ln
exchange rates.
(iii) Reqrrests that the rrcrk of the Deputies be fuIly integrated with that of
.ttre OD, C,ATT, Il'f and BIS'
(1v}CallsupontheGovernmentsofMemberStatesofthe
Corulunitytocontlnuethelrattemptstopersuadethe
Govarnment of the unlted states to adopt a less lnfrextbre
approach to thc probtem of the doLLar exchangc rate and to
move to a lover leveL of interest rates
(v) welcomes the formatLon of us/Japan consultatlve Forurt
onmonetaryproblemsandcallsfortheGovernnentsofthe
Member states and the commLssion to consider the best
wayofopenlngdiscusslonswlththeJapaneBeGovernment
on the garallel problems for Europe'
(vi) stronglY
Banks of
endorses considered lnterventlon by the central
Member states to smooth out temporary fluctuatLons.
(vll) BelLeves that the central Banks should contlnue to etudy
and practice joint lntervention to correct 'overshoot'r
where this is ltke1y to be effeetLve'
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(viit) Draws attention to the importance of limited
intervention as a neans of sigr,alling to currency
holders and giving tlme to reinforce correctLve
policles.
(ix) Accepting that the pn&nt nanagerent of corpora,te assets reqri^res a
reasonable retum, stresses that the main task of nanufrcturing oorpanies
should be the production of tangible realth and looks to t}te Finarce
Ministers of the Connunity to ensure a state of affairs wtere the
return on prodrrctirre inrrestrrent is npne attractive than the pru&nt
ImnagerrEnt of accrmulated cash balancts.
it*l Rendnds the Goverrnents of lEr&er States that their efforts in ttris
field are rore likely to be effective if they harress the political,
prodrctiver @tnrErCial and financial resourqes of the @rmunity as a
r+ho1e and tlqes that the Ccnmissiqr will cqrtinue to play an actirre
and effectirie role as the gitrardian of the Connunity's collectirre view
, 
t this field.
II
As reqards International Indebtggnegg-
3. (.) whlle the lnternatlonal credit system has eurvLved the
1983 crisls and the prospects for a return to general
stabilityarei:nprovlng,reschedulinglsfarfrom
complete, the exposure of private banks ls stlll very
high and the European banktng system I's vulnerable tO
any disorder ln the UE banklng conununlty'
(b)!4anydeveloptngcountrieshavesufferedseveredarrage
during the debt crisis. Thelr tradlng abllttles have
been seriously irnpaired and in some cases they have been
subiected to disturbing poLiticaI st'rains'
-9- PE E8.17E/fin.
(c) The lnternatlonal r..e.e!-:in+:r..i',...l...iFrjlr.i!C b:r._t,., I:.18.
the worrd Bank, the oEcD, the Iirs a,nrl the paris club
has generaily wittistooil Lhe Ler,L c,r .Lire crisis arrd
indlvldual I'nstitutions have renclereI o:.:Lstandlng services.
(d) I{hife the Cmrcier Banks trtsrle in the past, often wittr t}e enoEageilEnt
of natioal go\Errrents, strur a certain disregard for political rislr
and scne lealoress in evaluatfurg credit ratinge, they harc acted in a
responsible fashiqt when fac€d with the rec€nt enands fon reschedrling
and irpreased loans to borrouers.
(e) Natlonal or lnternatlonal guarantees of conunsrclal
loans are not deslrable; titey could have the !.onE term
effect of lnereatlng instablllty.
(f) There ls a presslng need for lnproved early*arnlng
of debt problems. '
!. The Parllament therefore:-
(i) Calls upon Governments of tlember States to lntensify :
their support for the IltF and the World Bank, both i
through prompt flnanclal reinforcement when needd and '
by rnalntalnJ.ng the authorlty of those lnstitutlons.
(ii) Rrquests the Il{F and the Hortd Bank to consider inproved co-operation
and burden-sharing nhcn dcating rith probtcms of indebttdnass, rhite
rcttining their distinctfvc roles.
(111) Requests the Menrber Governments to discharge thet;
responsLbllttles ln the IMF by careful monltorlng
of 'tpackages of neasures" to ensure that thelr polttJ.cal
effects have been adequately consldered.
(iv) Requests Governments to consider possibilitLes of
direct bitaterat support to debtor countries rhere the -
IMPts reasonable economlc crtterla are Ln confllct wlth
politlcal factors.
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(v) Welcomes the steps taken by the IMF to improve
surveillance and establish a more sensitlve early-
warnlng system acceptable to borrowlng countrles.
(v1) Belleves that the lnternational credit system muEt
be used to strengthen the tradlng capaclty of
borrovring countries and considers that thts criterion
._-_:hoold be mole generally apnlled.
(vii) In this connection, reIcores the closer and regular co-operation
between GATT, the rMP and the l{orld Bank on problems
of indebtedness and asks that thts actlvlty should be
extended and made tully effectl've.
(vi11) Requests that the co-oPeratlon now establlAhed between
the fMF, World Bank, and Comnerdlal Banke be naLntalned
and lntenslfled 3o as to enture a comnon underatandlng
and remove posslbllttles of confllct.
(ix) Welcomes the creatlon of the Ingtltute ofi'Internatlonal
Finance and requests Member Governments to publtcly
recognize ltsr imPortance.
(x) Requests the Governmentg of Member states to etudy, as
a natter of urgency, lrays of tmprovlng the flow of dlrect
equity j.nvestment to developlng countries whlle safeguardlng
their lnterests and economlc independence'
(x1) Reasserts its vlew that a fall ln world interest rates
wllt be the paramount factor in reestablishing the
credlt-torthiness of borrowers and calls upon the Govertrnpnts
of Member States to renew thelr efforts ln thts respect
with the US Government, as well as for the reaeons ln
2 (lv) above.
(xii) Recommends that further attention should be given to
analysing the balance of investmcnt bctwoon lnductrLallzed
and Thlrd World CountrLes.
(xiii) Reccnrends that the Conrunity anallrces the rapid rise of cormterErade
and other IirJGd tra& and its long-term effect on internatiqral
liqridity, the internatiqral financial sllsten and the rcrld tra&
pattern.
- 11 - PE tE.l7Elfin.
'F*{Atrrffii
III
5. As regards European Monetanr Co-operatl'on:-
(a)TheEuroPeanMonetarySysternhasfalledtoreall'ze
itsorlginalalmswhlchweretobrlngaboutecononl.c
convergencewithintheComnunityandtolncrease
lnstitutlonal and political unlty'
CommunLty Lnfluence in world trade and monetary
problems and its ablllty to negotlate on such
matters with other maJor-currency countries would
be lnproved by a strengthenlng of the E['lS'
(b)
(c)
6. The
(i)
(il)
The performance of the El'lS tn the fleld
rrtes has becn satisfrctory but, on balencc is
by the fallure of tho United Klngdott t'o
ln the Exchange Rate trlechanLsm'
Problems of
opportunltY
not be the
of exchange
rcakcned I,*
co-opGEato fully
(d) global f!'nanclal !'nstablllty provlde an
for closer unlty of the Cormrunlty and should
occaslon for lndlvldual or dLvielve actloo'
Parll-asrent theref ore : -
CaLts upon the European Councit' at
to devote sPeclal attentlon to
strengthen the EMS'
an car[y next mceting
the queetton of how to
Requests that thls dlscusalon ghould reexanLne the
problenswhlch.havedelayedfullpartlclpatl.onbythe
unlted Klngdom ln the Exchange Rate lilechanlsn'
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(iii) E\rrttEr qrsi&rs thdt this discussiqr shorld also establish direc{ives
for aceleratfutg the transitiqr to Phase 2 of the EtGi ard for enabling
all ncnber ountries to parLicipate in the slnstan to a fuller er(tent.
(iv) Requests the Council of ltlnlsters to approve,
, wtthout further delay, the adnlnistratLve Eeasuroa
proposed by the cmlsel0n ln its comrnlcatl0n
. 
No. 7L52/83.
(v) Asks the Governnents of Memher States to examlne
the present standing of the ECU and, in partlcular,
ways of encouraglng lts wLder use for:-
(a) Settlenent of iatergovernmeatal traasacti.one(U) Providin!-a ctearing systcr ior intra-Col.mity concrciat .
debts(c) Eurobond is$res
' (d) Invoicing of Connerci.al Debts(e) Loane and other financial transactioua ritb
noa-Corutraity couatri es(t,i) Invltes the Chalrman of tho European Cmmrnlty lionetary
comnlttee and thc secretary Gcneral of, FECot{ to attend
a nnetlng oi the Econonlc and Monctary Comlttcc of tlre
Parllenent to dlserrss thelr orianlzatlonrr cotrlbutions
to E\rrolnan ltionetarlz Ceoperatlon.
IV:
l. As regards future actlon:-
(a) Globa1 financial instablll.ty wtrether ln exctrange ratee
or ln the credlt systen, has a darnagLng effect on worrd,
Trade, and therefore on ths cxtornal trada of thc
Comunlty.
(b) fbb matters dlscussed ln ttrls report are esaentlal
factors ln any European econonLc recovery.
(c) rt is therefore tnportant that thls resorutlon and ttre
r acconpanylng report be consldered by parllarent t,lth
those contained ln the report by !rt. Albert and Profesaor Ball
on European Bconcl'c ntcot cry.
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8. fhe Parllanent therefore:-
(i) In adopting thLs Reso1utlon, ca1ls for lts
conslderation by other Instltutlons of ttre Comunlty
and by the Governrmnts of llenber States ln conjunctlon
wlth the ParlLament's rec@sndatlons on Europcan
economlc recovetY.
(i1) Requests the Commisslon to report back to Parllarent
as soon as posslble on lts own prolrcsals for dealinE
vith thc tattrs discusrcd md on lis prcscnt rotc
ln deallng wlth theu in lnternatlonal lrutltutlons
and dlscuesLons.
(iU) Requests the PresLdent of the Parllarent to fomard
this Resolutlon and tte acoorpanylng Report to ttre
Presldents of the Cqunlsslon and the @rmcll of lllnlc,lers,
to ttre Giovernrents of the l.fenber Statea, arrd to the Btes!.dGnts
of ttre IuF, the tlorld Bank, the Bank for InteraatLonal
Settlements, the Paris Club and the Ingtltutc for
Intcraatlonal Flnance.
-14- PE EE.l7Elfin.
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The effects on wor[d trade of financiaL instabi Lity
I. INTRODUCTION
I
A. ?revious ParLiamentary Activity
1. Since the ctections of 1979, the Par[iament has exanined aspects of the
internationaL financiaL system on a considerabLe number of occasiona.l Indeed, the
whole fiel.d had atready been studied in an exhaustive and penetrating report by Dr Arndt
as tong ago as 19?3 by the forner noninated ParLianent.2 Holever, in spite of
the passage of the numerous resolutions (cited in Notes 1 and 2 beLoy) LittLe
account appears to have been taken of the Partiamentrs vier.s. The explanation
for this may be found in the very general and ride-ranging tanguage of some of
the resolutions, as velI as the large nutnber of proposats contained in them,
which faced the Commission and Councit of ttlinisters yith too beri[dering a
choice from vhich to app[y themsetves to practicaI matters. Another discouraging
factor has been that reports and resolutions have often been overtaken by events
so that succeeding reso[utions have tended to contradict earlier ones. trlost
significantty, reports have sonetimes overIooked the strongIy expressed vieus
and policies of major governments.
?. The subject of the present report is: "The externat trade of the Conmunity
and the problem of gLobat financial instabiLity".3 Once again, this opens up a
gigantic fieLd of related problems. Neverthe[ess, rhite examining these in
some detai[, your rapporteur has endeavoured to drar up a draft resolution
trhich is Limited to ideas and measures which are rithin the competence of the
Commission or vhich seem to be uithin the sphere of rhat governments of l{enber
States can put into effect at an earty date, if they are uiLLing and determined
enough to do so.
,|
'(a) Ruf foLo report of 11.4.19E0 on the EttlS as an aspect of the internationaL
monetary system (0J C 117 ol 12.5.1980, pp.56-59)
(b) l{ieczorek-Zeut report of 14.E.19E1 on trade retations betyeen the EEC and
the Gu[f states (0J c ?60 of 12.10.19E3, pp.28-30)
(c) Purvis report of 15.?.19E2 on recycling of petro-doltars (0J C 128 of
16.5.1983, pp.46-50)
(d) Resotution on oil prices (0J C 6E of ?8.6.1983, p.63)
7
- Arndt report of 2E.5.1973 on reform of the yor[d nonetary
?8.6.1973
?
- l.lotion for a resolution, dated 14.1?.1982, by tlr Seeter,
ttrn Petikan (Doc. 1-1028t8?,
system (0J C 49 of
ilr Radoux and
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B. Structure of the report
3. The external trade of the Conmunity is onLy a part of worLd trade and is
affected by the same factors and considerations.
The reLationship betyeen rortd trade and financia[ instabiLity ritI be
examined under tro heads:
(a) tlhat are thc effects of ride and uncontrotted fluctuation in
exchange rates on the votume and character of yortd trade?
(b) To that extent does "overborroring"by certain countries distort
or restrict trade by Limiting the purchasing polrer (i.e. import
capabitities) of the borroring countries?
A number or suggestions are made as to hov to deal yith these tto sets of
probtens end a revier of the possibiIities of European monetary cooperation is
i nc luded.
4. Underlying both the above aspects are certain basic probtems such as.
infLation, lack of convergence and interest rates. It is important, therefore,
to have an agreed anatysis of hoy the present stage of instabiLity has bcen
reached as a background agoinst vhich to consider possible renedies.
II. EACKGROUND ANALYSIS
5. ln .1975, Dr Arndt, shocked by the breakdoyn of the Bretton Uoods system
and the effects of variabte exchange rates, rrote "A currencyts exchange rate
is a nratter of internationat concern. t{o vorld monetary system yil.t rork if
exchange rates are regarded as a purety national affair". Yet that is pre-
cisety hou they have been treated in recent years, uhatever protestations of
internationaI concern individuat governnents may make.
6. Present troubtes in the rortd economy have their beginnings in the
196013 and 1970's. Inftation began to increase fast during the l.atet60ts and
at different speeds in the different industriaLised countries, thus increasingty
forcing the values of their currencies out of tine. The fixed exchange rate
system ras quite unable to contain these strains and yas abandoned for ftoating
exchange rates in 1973. A return to thc basic conditiqn for fixed exchange
rates cou[d then onty be achieved by a strict convergence of the economies of
the States principaIty invo[ved - convergence through sinitar poticies for the
control of budget deficits and noney suppty, together rith corparabte rates of
investment and productivity. Such convergence has in no ray yet been seriousLy
at tempted.
-1E- PE 88.17Eltin.
7. the first and secmd oil crises also put innense pressure or currencies.
ffin 1974 to 1980, ttre 0ECD Sroup of industrialised countries faced averaEe current
resorted to high and often ccnpetitive interest rates in attenpts tb r€patriate
parE d ttee balanc.es.
8. rees DarcIcped Cunrtsies (IEs) witturt their 6,*n energy nffirroes fared
mrh twse. Dttrirxt the ssIE period their crlledtive arurual defieits rcre &oit
E47 billict. Lckirrg the financiaf eparatus to stannrh ttris *,rauls les of
c{litaI, tfuy rcre foroed to turn to bcroeing and cqrrercial banks readily
. 
todc tp tte role of int"enediaries betrcen tle surpltrs crnmtries of OFEtr and
otler tDCs. $te leve1 of interna'tiqn1 6t increased sevenfold frcrn 1972 to
L982, readlirq tr700 billiur by tte end of the period. At the sane tire, the
high irrtenesL rates for such transrctiqrs, f,olloriling t$ose rsr in force in nrcdt
indastrialised cqmtries and particularly ttree in the United States (since nost
fTrs rere made in &llars) Frtt an e\ten greats burden or borrcrrrcrs. i
9. It wag unforhnate that nnrch of ttris buronting had to be spent or infra-
stnsEural projects with lop q nll rates of return, r{as sotetinres mis4plied
in in&Etrial proJects withotrt so.rrrd financlal or nuuagef,Ent conuol and was
often even used to plug current mmt &ficits. Earning pcter has tlerefore
not keptpace with grorting croets of d{t-seryice. Itese irrcreased frcm }8t of
tlE total erForts of LEs in L980 to 24t in 1982. For the tuenty largest bor-
rqilers it nose to 408. To deal uith this situation, such countries must,.aohdtue inaneased
elports to in&rstrialised cu.urtries and re&rced fuports frcrn tlsn, a trEt
unrelccne solutiqr to $bst€rn states with their stagnant prodlrctidl, afrrerse
tra& balarres and high unenploynent.
10. In ttE rost reqrt phase o$ events, a nrlirtg factor has beerr t}te groring
aiverEence of the US eoorcmy aray fron ttp6e of other inudstrialised @untries.
Inability to cpntrol. nrcunting br.l@tary &ficits tras led through high interest
rates to an'orrcnralued &IIar. ltn tra& &ficit is nqr rr,rrrring at t70 billiqr
for 1983 and is likely to reach S100 billiqr next year. ltris lns greatly
irrcreased' the pr$letrs of restming stability.
11. It is terpting to look for institutiqral or rlunipulative renedies to
problenrs of flwtuating e:aharrge rate6 and otcessive ind$rte&tess. I{hile it
is tbry &sirable to use srch reans, tJre baeic need is fon controlled inflatiqr
at even rates, c€n\rErgencer stable enerqf prices and st€ady interest rates at
Ievels unnelated to the panic of the rocrent.
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III. EXCIIATiGE RATE INSTABILITT
A. Definitiqrs
L2' rt is vprttr distinguishing three different kind.s of o<c6ange rateinstability; ple take different viewrs as to rfietler each of ttgrr csr be or
strculd be cqrtrolled and to u,hat extents
(a) Misaligrnent
A cuEenqr may h tEld to be misaligred if its internal and o;1ernat prr-
ctusing pcrGrs can be seen to differ significantly for a prolcrged peniod.
sterling, for instarrce, wEls generally held to be seriorsly ggr-valLled in IggO/gI
wherr it tcnr-ted 92.40 to Gr. rt is equauy herd that the Jryanese yen at
230/280 }ras for sorE )tears been seriorsry un&r-valrred. uisaligrturt may be
the resurt of goverurent poricies in setting rrnusually higtr or lqr irtterest
rates or of e>ctraneors factors such as the o<istene of llorttr Sea oit in tlre
case of Britain, the attractiqr of holding langer-term Arerican assetg in the
case of ttE us (the secure ttarren effect,) or the abeerrce of instnrents fc.
retaining free capital in the case of Japan. rf one accepts the reality of nis-
aligrnent, then it follqrs that it nust prodrce sigrnificant distoLtiqls in tra&.
An furportant rninority, ho,Errer, does not, accept that misaligrurerrt can exist,
arguing that all:rat€s reflect nrartet, and stnrctural foroes and are tlprefoe
"realtr ' Ycnrr raFPorteur des believe that errrencies can be wilfully or otlp:-
wise rnisaligned.
(b) qrcrstrcot,
A tenporarily rnisaligned currutcy noving to a new, nrcre realistic IerrcI
nEy nm beyiond it and renrain for scne tfune in a statc of inrrcI,ntary r€\rerse
misaligrurent' An exarpre was girren by sterring r*trire nwing frtm rmderyarrtatiqr
to ovenraluation bry no less than 68t beteEe,n the erd of 1g76 ard tlE end of lggo.
overshoot can equally be pro&rced by non-financiar infrrrences strtr as severe oi!.-price changes, political electims or no,tice fron gorerrnents of clranges in their
ecqrcnric policies. Arl of these affect the epectatians,of gurrenqp horders agto ttct^' a currency wirl betrarre and can lead to oftensive ctranges in rates.
(c) Flutter
ltris is the day to day rr,,\rE''Ert of ctrnencies by a ferp points. rt
reflects the - nerirqrsness of holders of crrrrencies qr the qre. hand ad. the
skirls of foreign erchange managers and dealers qr tlre other. Etrr inetan*, in
the first nine nonths of I9gI, the ,/lDttf rate ffiby ll to 2 percent qr 104
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trading days ort of 195.I ltris kind of arbitrange tras been brmgrt abort by
.the speed of np&rn cwnrnicatione and the &velqurt of inforrnation technology
to an qver higtpr and higtpr degree of firc-tr.uring and has been described as
'rthe Perfect c4ital muket".2 I srpose that,, tlecetically, srrctr develqrents
cofld lead to a rrnoFenergy statetr in ntrich the rniversality of instant informa-
tian precluded any &aler frun jurping another cre, but at present the pfrenorcnon
remains a major nuisance (or qorttrnity) fon fund nnnagers. So lcrg as the
dosrnside risks of holding currencies for any length of tjne remain so gareat as
in tJp present state d elahange rrolatility, currency hol&rs and nranagers will
be curstantry qr the nore.3 (ArEIe:( 1)(For f,fgurqs on ex.change Hr\renGnts ses Anncxrs I., II and III)
B. Effects of VolatiliBz
13. Ihe general aeslqlti.cr of earlier discueeicr in tte Parlianent has beert
that rc,ld,ility d erchaage rates mut, directly i*libit tra& and that a direct
cpnelatiqr etdsts befirreen tlp sftent of volatility and the volwe of trade.
Your ramorteur tns fornd'no evideme to erport this view. I{trile a country
with a seriosly ovs-valrred GrrreJ6y'wi11 find its eryorts inhibited, it is
also likely to increase its irporte slurply; over the r,crld nrarket as a wtrole,
tiere is little direct effect frcm this e\rcnt. GATT, tuho are rightly tkre nrcst
watchful of internatioal cganisatiqts in ttris field, harre sporsored a detailed
study wtrich conclu&s that the fcts ertanlirEd srrygest fr. . . tlnt there was no
direct adtrerse effect of ercharge rate varjability qr the level of international
trade, wtrich rgemairred influerd rminly by tte underlying. GNP grcrtfr".4 Indeed
this last clause holds the key to the reportrs thinking since it fi:rther sug-
gFsts rr. .. that drestic rnamoeclrnric policies ttre nore influence on the trade
balarrce of a crcuntry than a ctrange in its elcfrarEe rat€".5
14. $lhate\rer the Irck of correlatim in these plcnrcna, it is not possible to
believe that frequent and large fluctuatiqrs in sr:ch an inportant elsrcnt as ttrc
I f,onf"t*sy addnese to the Atlantic Institute for InEernational Affairs,
22.t0.1981
2 gl*kh*st and Trrnlir. Trade Relatiqrs un&r Flexible Drchange Rates, p.5
3 S* Lanfalussy. Addnees to Financial Tfures Conference, L6.2.1983, par-
ticularly AruE ( 3 v*rich is repro&red with this report as Anne:< I
4 gI*kh*st and Trxtlir. Tra& Relations tur& Elexible Dahange Rates, p.3
5 op..ia., p.8
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exchange rate ^corld have no damaging effects on tJle econcmy. They are cerAirly
't{kprrcipn and a nuisarrce and the follcr*ing points may be rnade:
(i) Unpredictable flrrctuations (and wtren harre elctrange rates been pre-
dictable?) discorrage manufacturers frcrn engaging in erytrt hrsiness
because of the urrcertainties which surrornd long-tenn cmtraCts.
E:<change risk insurance is a costly, troriclesqre and soretines
ina@uate defence-
(ii) Far too mlch mErnagelrEnt tirrE is devoted to exchange tnanagqEnt Httich
should be spent on inprorring prodrtq and prodr{ivity-
(iii) Ttrere has undoqbtedly, in sore national ecqrsnies, been a long term
ratctret effect with increases in inpont prices (ald cfisequerttly
wages) in tires of undenraluatiqr being caried fenard into tires otr
otchange readjustrent.
(iv) Ihe persisterrce of an uruaturally high value for a particular currenqf
Ieads to clanorqrs pressure for protectionist Po1icies, as for instanc€
in the united States in I982lI983. At its horst, it pro&rces cotF
petitirre devaluatior in a search (always fnritless in the lot! nn)
for irseagcd oeorts. Examples' have been the ccmPetitirre braluatiqrs
betlcen S€den and Finland wtrich wiII be exatired in the Pnnot report.I
(v) lbst seriors is the pr$able effect, m investrent. ftere is the dis-
couragirrg influencc of an unsettld antlook in elchange narkets ard
the ccrseqlerrt difficllty of calcrrlating returfft. Ttrere is the tenPta-
tion to l66k for a return or unenplqpd funds bry rcvirq t}pm arond tle
rsrey rnarkets. Ttris becsres verlt strong indeed nhere profits are
being seriorsly squeezed in corntries with ornnnlued orrrencies.
Indeed, since the return qr investngrt in nranufacturing irdrstry
within the Ccrmunity has steadily fallen in reoent' years, ttl
inducqrent to nure cash out of ligid ftrnds into plant and
equigent beccnes less attrictive'
C.Gorlernrcnt@
15. Yorr rapportanr, in seeltirg to reccnrrend to Parlimrt a vicrr qr ttris
natter, has fogrd no Consens\rs at all atu19 g6r7ernpnts or tlheir eCmsniC
advisers. A rnajonity of rmrld trade is carried qr in dollars ad tjle attitul
of tle united states edninistration taards the valrre of their crr:rerlcy and its
fluctuat.ions is of orerr*trelnring iflPortanc€. Ihe us authcities rritfidr* ftu
intenrenrion in early 1981 and tjreir drctrine is that it canld only be reancgd
I lo.i* for a resolution tabled by Miss Gloria tlocPer of 25-11-1983 (De. L-924/821
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in crisis curditims rfien rnarkets beore "disorder1y". tlo definitiqr of this
tenn tns been found hnt it is generally assrred that a Presi&nt hufld have to
be shot'again in order to justify intervqtion. fhe argurcnts dranced by the
US Treasury to srryporE this attitude are dressed in ecqtonic }angrage. Your
raFporteur was told that atterpts by the Eruqeans In the l.rst )rear to practiso
intenrentiqr (ttarrce and ecrmany) harre failed and prorred the total inCffectirrc-
ress of such actiqr, tiat even 'rsterilised interyention" has an accelerating
effect on rrDney sr:pp1y, that intervention is an artificial concept because cur-
rencies autgnatically find tleir qiln "real" level an that the mly way to
stabilise ellctrarrge rat€s is by con\rer{Frrce betlrcen ecqrcnries. one 6ees little
atterprt. to achierrc srrh cuxrergence and qre has to ask r*hetter the nft.ives for
srrh attitudes are really a prioni econcrnic or ex post facto political. they
certainly harre a trarsh i&ological ring at tfures. There is also the discrcn-
certirry fact that they are drcpped h,hen ttEre is discr.rssion of the yeq/dollar
relatiqtship. The onty recent significant intervention by the United States in
foreign exchange markets uas to prevent a yeakening of the Yen in August 1983.
15. Ttre difficulty of justifying wcn vierps is s-trom Uf tf," cqrtradictiqrs in
the analysis offered by different speakers at different tires. For instarrce,
the Chainnan of President Reaganrs Oorncil of Econonic Advisers, in a higtrly
scphisticated aralysis earlier ttris ),ear, argud that ttre high valr-e of the
dollar was the sole and natural result of tlre high real interest rate in the
US, ttris itself being in turn the cursequence of US gorrcrrurent hdgetary
deficits.l Ttre A.ssistant Secretary to the Treasury, on tte ottEr hand, stated
six ngrttrs later: "Interest rates are a factor frcm tinre to tine but my basic
curclusiqr is that they have not been ttre dcrninant elplanatory frctor in dollar)strengttt".- IIe Particularly singled out t}te "secure-haven factor" as a npre
ilTPortartt consideratisr. In all these argrr-urents, the fupossifrility of finding
a "true value. for the &llar is plea&d as the justificatiqr fon taking rn
action. As the siecretary of State for Treasury has Ert it, the Aftdnistration
lufld like to see a solEflhat weaker dollar in order to help US opcts but
"... that desnrt nean rerre Eoing to do anything abort it".3 Ttre Fe&ral
Rbserve Bank, dtich traditiqrally o,r1d be opected to r:rge a far nore inter-
ventiqtist role, has been stripped of freedcrn of actisr. the Chairman, wtrile
reoognising that n... etchange rates have flrrtuated wildlyttuuigturemrch of
I l,t"ttin EtsIdstein. Address to the corrEil of Enreign Relatiqrs, llew york
1r.4.1983
2 a"o1rf $rinkel. lbstimry to lhrse gantcing Sr$-sunittee, lrlashirgtcr,
27.10.1983
3 Oqrata Regan. Intcnris with tlew York Tires, 29.3.1983
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the floa1-ing era', and tlrat n... tJE er*ent and timing of sotc of tJe Oarrys
hale, even in retrospec{ been diffictilt to oplain.',I f,"= felt himself rlrabte
to remrd (let alqe inplarent) any rredial actiqr ottEr ttEn ttn fadliar
cqNrergerne effo-t. As a nrrter of tIE re&ra1 Reserrie oqtressed the sitwtiqt
to yurr rappcteur, 'Ite prinrry of tJE Treasury over the F.ed ms always
recognised hrt it uas ne\Er dorceduntil this Adninistratiqt". (wits have
said- that if tlnse in tlE treasury betrave wittr the vigurr of reforred drulkards,
peqle at tte Eled sbh, the erd"icns of deprived children).
17. It is t6rd to resist ttc feeling ttnt the present US Adrdnistratiqt prefers
to finarrce imre@rt. at hcre by drawiry cryita1 frcrn abroad rather than by cut-
ting its crm hdEet, &ficit. InH, they ryear to have no political nEans
for srrtr tndget discipline. Itrey are not really cqrerned with the negatiw
effect of ttris poliqf ar &rrestic inrrestnent in other countries.
:'-
Ig. Of ccprse, this state of affairs is not wholly unfarrourable to the
cfirurd.ty. Itle high value of tjre &lIar has given €rn enorttuls bGt to Ccnrrunity
er*orts to the tnited States and tras inhibited Arerican fuPort's- Ihe U.K.,
trtrich invoies its oil sales in U.s. &llars, tras receirrcd an furyortant o<tra
incore. lErrcrthe1ess, these U.S. viemn harre rpt been wi&Iy accepted within
the Ccrrngrity. It is true that the tK Treasqry has repeatedly en&nsed ttren
but the Bant( of Enqland has strorn scrrE @nc.ern. Ttre @uty Covertnrr almle a
cautio's cqrrpntator, recently stated: nI belierre that the substantial and
endrrring elctrange rate swings of necent lears are likely to have played a
significant parE, in halrpering ecsronic perfornrarrce and irpairing the strengt'h
of the preselrt regoverylnz. rtre figrres published by the Bank of rnternational
settlerent-s dl ,'o\rershoot" are eloqr.rent; their Assistent cgreral uanaEer ttas
pointed out, for instarre, that fqE fuIl clcles in $14{ flrrctuatiqr took
place AEing the first nine mrths aft€r t}te US abanfuied intenrcrrt'iqr-3
ffrite npst mrld qrsticr tJe realign (otter than as a political stirnilan€)
of Presi&rt l,litterand's call at llilliarSung for a new Eettst fre t1rye of
agnemrt, tfEre is a gercral dasirc to see scrre actiqr. And even if ttE lasE
rqmd of mjc intgventicrs b1z tle @rmn and Eterrch arttprities proved e$p€tl-
sive and did rd. drieve tfc tarpted resrrlts, ttEre has be€n rn &anffi b1z
eittEr of tle lffier S;tates of ttE prirEaple thart. aticr to crrlc rclacility
is nee&d. In an extrrely &ailed and reardpd exairatian of tIE 1r&La,
1 p.rt A. \Ioldr. Afress to UE fu€r( essaiatisr d Eica, likr IGtc,
28.4.1983
2 Aristcpfrer ttbllilut. A&esB to tIE InEnatianal Eald llihrE ffieur.e,
Lcftr, 14-15.U.1983
3 llerste ldalussy. A&ess to tb m.Iantic Institute, BnEels, zi|.LO.lStsL
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the British House of Cqnncns suggested: "l{e (therefore) farrour rtrtrat r,rre term ajoint exchange rate,/rnonetary policy regfure, in rtrich nonetay policy takes
account of both internaL demand and external ccryetiti\jeness;"1 and iL examines
with minute care the problems of targeting for such a policy. Ihis suqgestion
renrains under c'.i.scussion and has not been afuted by the British parlianent as
l€t,. UNICE, in its declaration ained at the Athens Sumit, has again stated:
"Foremcst amcng UNICETs reqrriranents ... is the creatiqr of mntary stability
in order that ccnpanies' decisiqrs on capital openditure can be nade with the
minirnun of uncrertainty..2
D. Interrrentim in Erchange l,larkets
19. t'ltratever. vieru qle takes of the rreed for actian, the likely srcess of
'!
intervention by Central Banks in the erctrange markets ranains irt.di+nrte. the
minimalist vien has tenM to.follor Friednan's thesisr'laid do*n 20 years ago:
"Ttlere should be a sinple criterion of success - uhettEr the (intenrcning)
agency makes or loses rDney".3 llorever, a study tr$lished this year by tne
BIS concludes that thjs criterion cannot reanirgfully be applieil to rcasurc
the effectiveness of intenrentiqr. Instead, tlre anthors put fomardl ner cri-
teria which.'r... strongly indicate that official intenrcntion in the case of
three currencies (Dtt, Yen and sterling) was predcninantly of the stabilising
nkind".= Ttrey csrclude that "... in the present rcrld of pronomced urrcertainties,
rrel} timed official intenrention can be influentia* and has an iryortant role to
play"
20. Ttre report on the sarrc subject ccnmissimed by the Versailles Sumit is
extranrely ryarded but contains the follor.ring passages "The rcrking gro4p felt
that int€nEntion hact been an effectirre tool in the prsrit of certain exchange
rate objectives - rotably tjtosc orientated tcrnrds influncing the betrauiorrrs
of erchange rates in the short run'.S As for lmger tern intcnenticn, tie
report makes a nrbcr of pointe:
I tto,r"" of Courcnsl Treasury and Civil Seryice ccrmdttee. second Special
Report qr Internaticral lbnetary Arrargarents, 11.5.1983
2 Usfe. IrErorardln for ttre Speial Corncil, 3.I1.I983
3 l,tilton Ftiednan. Itre Case for Flexible D<ctrange Rates
A
' l{apr and ftrrychi Official Intenrentiqr in the E<change trlarkets:Stabilisiql or Destabilisirg? BasLe, I.{areh 1983
5 n pott of t}e tbrking C,rop an Etchange l,tarket. Interventiqr (Chairnan
Philippe Jurgenson) l{arch 1983
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{lJ -Irttenrcntiqr alone (partio*larly sterilised interrrention) was scrile-
tirras insufficient to affect exchange rates unless acccnpanied by
dcrestic Policy adjustnents. Ttris bears qrt the vien in the House of
Ccrrons report cited abo\re.
(ii) Intenrention can "buy t,irE" for market participants to recognise t11e
factors causing disorganisation and thus acts to restore confiderrce.
(iii) Intewention can srrccessfully be used to take part of t5e strain on a
currency, rather than to keep it at a particular rate.
(iv) CIoseIy cordinated actiqt betrreen parties had beell me effectine
at tines ttran by one Central Bank.
It should be noted that all these obsenrations arie made orly to a limited
degree of interrrrentiqr.
E. To.aards a Eurcpean Vieu
2L. It is possible to suggEst t}te broad qrtlines of a vien by the ParliaEnt,
drawn frcm thit often contradictory maEerial.
(i) .civen ttre groling divergence of the econcmies of }eadirg in&rstrial
countries in.the last 12 Y€ars, any atterpt to nraintain a fi:<ed rate
system after 197I rmuld rp dorrbt harre prorea erren ntcre danaging to
ecoru[ies than hhat roe have elgerienced.
(ii) within a floating systanr, countries mrst be pendtted and encorraged
to correct rnisalignnent, ht &valuatians &sigrted to inczease ertports
are neither &sirable nor fated to srceed.
(iii) A floating system des not rean that frequent andwide fluctuations
harre tobe accepted. Such rrolatility is danagirul to freedan 'eif traile,
to eryort planning and to inrrestncnt.
( iv) Convergence in the econcrnies of in&strial ccnrrtries, par:ticrrlarly
those with c.crnonly used trading crrrrencies, rtray be &sirable but is
unlikely to be achieved by nere e:<hortation or a general undefined
approach. Conrrergence c€nsists of a ccnplex of fastcs (noney sr.ply,
pro&rctivity, exctrange rates, etc. ) for r.trich targets nust be separaEly
studied and agreed before being bro.rght togetler, closely related iri a
joint policy.
(v) Non-intervention in foreign ercttange nrarket-s is no mcre neutJat ttran
intenrention, it prodLtces its orn effect on the balarre of rates at
any tfurE.
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(vi) Errcry atterpt shoutd be made to persuade t}rc ArErican l&inistEatidt
to a trial period of linited, cocperative intertrgntion &si$Fd to
snrcth out fLutter.
(vii) Ttre problenrs of c.verstrct are unlikely to be ade$atcly fcaOlwd
in the foreseeable futrrre because iC is rrot corrceivable that tito
present US Adninistratiq'r, grann&d on tha bedrock of its htdget
deficit, wiII abandon its opositiqr to systenratic interyenticn.
Ne\rertheless, individual countries or lIroJPs of cu[rtries may lD
able to pursuc linited actions trnttris field, pirticufarly to Golntcr
the nwry rnn-econonlc factors irrfluencing elalun$ rateg.
(viii) S<change rate control by Ccrmnity nrnbers Imrst be pragupticl. tlat
is to say, it should be the mirror-inrage of curvanggmoe Poli@Y,
ccmbining intervention with &restic policies.
( ix) Interrrention shqrld normally be a joint activity for which ccErlpn
aims rurst always be agfeed betrreen tfE aqent6'
(x) Central Barks stptrld have in rnind the irportarrce of intawqttian as
' a nEans of gjlEralilg to currerry holders, inf\nrrirq tfieir elPqc-
tations and giving tinp to reinforce corrcctirre policiel.
1xi) Ttre first outlines of internatiqral machircry set W by tha
versailles Sr^rnrdt shotrld bd reinforced, cqfinled in their tqdtor-
ing po,ers and prorrided with the staff to study and &vise +qEt.c
' rrp&ts for convergence. Ttrey shorld &al toEetlrcr, ratlcr thgt
replace, ttre o<isting cqrpeterEe in ttris field of @D, G$qf, t$e
t
IItlF, the C,rop of TtrifiV and the BIS.-
.Z?. An atterpt has been rna& in the&aft, resolution to turn adr a viar into
a ferrr Urnited, practical suggesticrs in the political plane- fmq tJEsE, thF
reinf,orcencnt and proper rrse of the netr nrachiner; referred to in (xi) irbve is
paraErnt. yqrr ramorteur bclieves that nrh Pr€Paratory rprk upcdo to be
tundertaken in ttris way before tlEre can ry any point in srmdiig a ganeral
rr61gtary cqrfererrce as has been suggest€d bf, Presi&nt t{itterand ard is the
ParIiarent.
I
' It is hprth noring that the first neeting of ttre Cfirtittee of deputies ot
Finance l,{inlsters set W after the l{il}ia!8t,trrg Sultrlit tok plxe in
iinvani:er 1983 to consider the intcrnational rslftary Bystt-
PE E8.I7d fin.
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'l'. fhe rrobleru of tne Yen-
2r. This extremely important matter has been dealt'
vith outside the general discussion of exchange'
rate problens because it appears to be uniqueto its kind. Your Rapporteur does not accept
the view, which has been sonetines'expresse0in Parlianent, thst the Japenese euthorities
en6aEie in "dirty floating" and that they areCeliberately keeping down the value of the Yen.
On the contrary, they hsve shown readiness tointervene in support of the Yen and and it is
the US Treasury which has nonnally declined to join in
such support operations. 1t snould be renenberedthat it was the US and certain Europeaa Governments
who prevailed, upon the Japanese Governnent soneyears ago to abandon, most reluctantly, their
stringent €xclang€ controls. fhe sharp difference
between present high US interest rates and the
low rates which are traditional to the Japanese
econorrJr, the huge yen balances which becane
availabLe for conversion into dollars by JapaBesc
banks, iusurance conpanies and trading housest
and the "Green Card" fiasco which led to the
wholesale expatriation of private accounts ortheir conversi.on lnto gold holdings are (takento6ether) quite sufficient to e:rpfain thi low
value of the currency. Only a retura todoaestic econonic e:rpansion (with linited
inflationary results) and a liberaLizatiqr of Jaganese
capital markets allowing and encouraging a rajor inf_Iovr
of foreigrn funds, can re\rerse the present Fosition. f
24- llhis situatioD, causes an acute problen for theCgr*llily, which ran e trade aeiicit with Japanof sLo.5 billion for L9a). This deficit contiauesto rise. The baslc reasons are certain conparative
advantages of Japanese manufacture, theilpenetrability of the Japanese naiket Cueto orgqrlzational and psychological Non-Tarriff Barriers, -and,tha reluctance of EanyEuropean nanufaciurers to tackle so difficuitgnd eleensive .a task as e:cporting to Japan.But obviously Ehe difficulties arE' nad,e very
nuch worse by the preseht value of the yen.
25. The US d,eficit with Japan is alnost twice largerthan the Comrnunityrs. lloreover, roost Japauesetraie is in doIlar terms. rn this fleld-, therefore,the US adninistration.has abandoned its feneralviews (uncier severe political pressure 
"i h;;;iand has recognized a- ,'roisalignient,'. Ihis is nowof great coneern to presidcnt Eeagan and, a jointConsultative Forum has been cet u! by the US
flgnsurf Departoent and the.JapanLse'Ministry of!'inancet foIlowing th:e Fresidentrs visit to -
Toky.o 11!t yeer. -The problen nust be iackled.rn the fir-<t place as one of the yen/doIla.r rate,lut lt is very ltronsly to be reclarae"ala thatGovernnents of Meriber.States and, the coeissioa
:l:**-"rgently consider settiug ,.p p"raUelcoasultative nachiaerT . 
.
1' Jo= ao excelleut d,iscussioa-of thte pfobrcrn Bee: c Fred, Bergstea,evirence before the senati ro"eiil $i;;Iii"-EIr=itt.".
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ry IMIERNATIO{AT, INDERTEDNESS
A. Nature of the problenr
262 A very brief analysis uras made, in Section If of t}ris report, of hcn^r Ttrird
!'lorld eountries calrre to assulE an unnanageable burden of debt. statistics on
the e)ftent of indebtedness are set out in Annex. IV. A particularly inportant
indicator is the ProPorti.on of the main borrcEr-countries, erports represent-ed
by debt servicei figures for this are given in Annex v.
?7. i{o^tever, it is not just the arptnt of indehtedness (either in absolute
figr:res or rrer capita) that distin$ishes beEreen the plights of tl':e many bor-
rcrcrs. Each country has its own different rerationsh-ips betrreen cahl 6sfl
econcnric performancei accordingly, the sitrration has had to be &alt with as a
series of individual cases and rpt as a g1&al problem. (It shcnrld be rernernbered
that' 80t of the debt of LEs is o*sd by only 20 of thgn). Ttre situation reached
a cisis in the winter ot L982/L983 and threatercd to precipitate a collapse of
Lhe whole internationar credit s)rstem with a conseq.rent ectnordc depression curr
parable co that of the r930'g - G rorse. such a disastcr has been avertd, but
h'e are left with certain effects wtrich could perslst if a rncre ratiqral and
sffure rEans of stpenrising internacional borroring and lending is not &vised.
B. 
€ffects of the crisis
2E. The effect of Last winterts events on the Lending countries and
i'nstitutions vas to produce extrene nervousness. The thraat of a
collapse in the nhole credit systen had cone too ncar for comfort. private
banks, busy since 1974 (rith the encouragemcnt of their governments) in
the profitabts task of on-tending pctro-dottars throrgh the netuork of
interbank and syndicated loans to the eventual third uorLd borroners, 11ere
suddenty alrare that their information about thG size and structure of debt and
of the use to vhich toans rcrc put vas inadequate. Atthough the route from
depositor to finaL borrouer ras, in fact, usuaU.y a short one the finaL
destinations of loans vere often not reatised by bankers untit the crisis had
hit them- They found that they uere then unabte thense[ves at the poLiticaL
leveL to obtain the necessary econonic measures by borrorrers to protect the
banks' toan assets.
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29. Apart frcrn these irplications of possible rrrcaknesses in the recrTcling
systan, tl^e si'plicicy, easy ftrnctioning and profitability of tjle praeedings
seeln to have obscr.red any general econcmic irplications' llhile tle prwision of
Ioans to r.Dcs is at all tines necessary in ttre cqrditiqrs prodrred bY t\io malr
increasesinuorldenergyprices,currentt.rendsaloneceterrninedt}realleatiort
of resources betreen dcnestic inrlestrcnt in the lnd,striar-ised conrtries and on-
lending to LEs for rrrtrat r.pre often urtrorly non-prodr:ctive uses. ntrile lroLlr rap-
porteut? &)es noE. personally belierrn in the efficacy of eitlrer nationally or
internationarry pranned arrocation of inrrestncnt, he recognises the varue of'onitoring
and guidance. He mu$t.therefore drau attention to the fact that the demand factor
in this vast t.or of resources uas often totatty undiscipr.ined and, irdeed, aren ukrrcun
except as patternless fragrents. 9{hile this will harre ensured the higtl sPeed of
redistri.bution, it cannot harre placed funds there they r"rere necessarily lilely to
sEengthen tlre unrlil econcmy and ensure an early recovery after tlre trrc oil
crises. It is puzzling that no ProPer study of tfiis asPect seems yet to hatre
bcnen tmdertat<en. Src of the reqrired matefial, hcneUer, tEY be for:nd in the
BIS report for I982l83.I
30.Ttreeffectsoftheseel,entsont}cborroruirrgcEuntrieshavealso,of
course, bc.en seriotrs. the rost daroaging has already been rpted - the hi$t pro'
porti.on of exports rePresented for scne borrqers by d-trt rrvice' To this ctst
must be added Lhe relatirrcIy high price of energy inPorts dring ttre long
periods of readjustflEn't, after the ttro oil-priee rises' I't is also obvious that
the general recession rdrich follo,Jed those rises has depressed the prices of the
main ,Ihird g*rrld e:gorts srrh as minerals and tropical agrictrltural cqcrpdit-ies'
Anlrone or nrcre of tlrese factors or the ccnlcined cffect of all three, has been
disastrous for rnany countric.
31. seconclly, as also noted in section, II, the borrcners hatre had little
choice but to c{rt back inPd'ts drastically and psh ergonts, ilEluding manu-
factgred gods. Ttris cqres iII to the t{est and has tna& nrore diffiaflt the
recovery of the in&rstrialised cormtries'
I Sunf for Inrernat,ional Settlerents. Fifty-third Annual Report. Basle, 13.6.83
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32,rhirttt,thtfinanciatendtradingdisciptincaadopt?d,ofteninposidfron
sebroad or by intGrnational institutions, havc ptaccd ,stvcre 
pol,iticat strains
'"rr'rot. 
Lccs and causcd intcrnat unrcst' Quite apart fro thc traditioaat
,,packag!..of.disciptincsatra,sinsistcdonDlthcl.[..f.,thefrctthetastt,ch
ettllbitl.ionrrrnecdcdesabridging.toanforBraziterptainsvhytendcr.sare
.ot .."ity found today tgrlcss thcy cen be assured that adequate discipLines
uil.tbccrcrtcdiathcncrtphase.There:ignationatthebcginningofSeptcrser
gf thc Govlrtrcr of thc Senk of Erazil vas an indication of hov disturbing such
pr.cisuras fror Landcrs cm be'
31- finetty, thc crisi: rey havc brought about a ccrtain coarsening of the
rel.ationships betyeen tcndcrs and borrOlcrs' Borrovcrs l6ge that crcditqrs
yire potentieL[y ovcr-tcnt tnd thcir dcaands for refinrncing rerc ronctircs
nade in ruthGr brutal l.bngut$cr .t lf to strggcst thty'night not heiit'te to puL[
dotrn thc vhotc sytteil if not srtisflcd' 'It is to bc hoped that this nood hrl
dissiprtcd uith thc .rtrclG rtegc of thc crisic'
3l;. GencralLy, oae can onty fcet disappolntrcnt th6t t S:'stcn uhich 3prafig up
spontancousty, rapidLy and effectivcLy to recyctc crpital' batances shout'd 
not
havc bccn an e.fficient cnough ila.ns of improving the carning capacity of
devctoping cconolies, thereby increasing uortd tradc' tnstead' that trade has
diainishcd. tJc aust look for a bctter perfornrnce in the next round'
C. Intcrnational' FinancirI l{achinerv
35'.OcbatesandResotutionsofthisPartiaocnthavcoftenthrorrnupProposats
for ncy instittitions.l An exptoration of tt' fi'td' holever' reveats a vast
rcb of cristing pubtic and privttc institutions; cach highty specirtiscd ard
coilprtaht in its ovn ficLd, ebtc end ritting to eppty the lessons of rcccnt
events. Ihe naturc lnd functions of thcse vlrious bodies are not r[*ays
c.tearty knorn by liEPs and I havc thcrcforc dcscribed thm bel'ou' Ie are et@st
fntircty depcodcnt on thci for Intcrnrtionat toettlry 
(Lrndiag) Arrt4etr€nts
md if the systeil docs not nov vork property, cc rtatt bc in vcry aarious trouble'
I(a)
t6. This is the'bcst knorn of rl.L the pubtic institutions end thc centre of ttr
uhoteueb.ItscoCIpositionisatnostunivcrSal(146eountrynambers)endiS
rcsponsibi Li tier att-pcrvedlng. Thcy irrclrse irrtcrnrtimet ronat'ry coQptration'
,,. .rctovaL of rcstrictions on forcign erchlrtgc s.rltions, dcbt reschcd'rling a6d
inftuence on tlorLd tiquidity thfouih the is3ue Of SpeciaL Drruing tights tsm3l'
There ar? many fceturGs of the I.ll.F. rhich are of lnportence to this rcFoft'
See, for instance, liOtions for Resotutions lttachad to Reports
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37. First, the resources of thc fund are limited and vere not suffkicnt to
deat rith the rccent crisis. The decisions nhich uere rnade to supptenent those
funds by an increase in quotas rnd under the GcnGrat Agreenent to Sorrov have
stil.t not be?n futty imptemented. The greatcst obstacl'e'{ras been stouness by 
t
the u.s. congress to honour the dccisions. This has happity nou becn resolvcd
but the outtook for the l.tl.t. and for thc rcst of the intcrnationat fnon€tary
systc!yhichirsoctosctycnmeshcdyithityitl.nevcrbcbrightifinportant
etcncnts in thc u.S. regard the Fund's oan.gers as mo3tLy unrel'iabLe forcigners'
out to nalkc Lifc easy for undiscipLined LgCs at the Grpense of the U'S' taxpaytr'
ThcGonmunity,sFinanceHinistershevcaheavyresponsibil.itytorakesurcthat
this vian doas not gain ground. The l.it.t. oust h'vc rcasonrbte rcsort to
increasei rontributions from ncatbers ln tines of erisis and, if nationaI Trcasuries
arc not prcpared or ebte to makc thcsc avail.abl'r, the Fund shoutd itsctf bc abl'e
to borro{ in intrrnrtionaL capitaI earkets, as suggt6ted recbntLy by the'Group
1
of Thi rtY.
36. Second, it iS essenti.t th.t th! authority of the I.lr.F. be uphetd' uithout
this, thcrc is no agGncy vhich can neintain..trust bctvscn borrouer and tender
or providc a safe haven in storms. uLtimatcLy authority depends on having enough
funds, brlt thcre are othar aspccts. The doninant "Group of 10" should atuays
shoy their confidence in the organisation end this reinforces the point about u.s-
attitudes. It has atso bcen strongl.y argued that thc Fund voutd have greatcr'
authority if its nanagencnt structurc-u€r'e 619ps broadLy representattve of'both creditor
and debtor nations from the Third tlorLd. This is a Gonstant sourcc of dispute
bctyccn iffCflO and the principat contributing governoents. Eoth thc Interith
conrnittec of Directors and thc Erecutive Board have becn graduatty expanded to
rcct this. demand, but thc inf lucnce of the oLd,industrial.iscd countries is sli'LL '
paranount. It is obviouSty no good pushing such reforns to the point vhere thc
aain contributors tosc confidcncs th.t their quotas and toans nitt be propcrty
handLcdl Thc situation nccds regutlr revier vithout drastic action'
59. Third, thc l.ti.f. hac to shor grcet scnsltivity in deating vith borrovers
and eittt the rescheduLing of tlrcir debts. srnsidivity does not lcan taxness or
hesitancy in denandiqg f inanciat diseipt ines-vhcn tting avaitabtc or+anering
facitit{cs. This conccpt of "conditionality" is ccatraL to thc oFrr*"ion of the
Fund and is discussed in the next section of this rcacrt-
1 Sce Consuttative Group in Intcnnttionr.t Econonic and tlonetary Affairs:
Annuat Report 1981
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40.Fourth,theI.l{.F.needstobeabtetoforescedevelopmentsandshouldnot
be taken by surprise. A Lot of vork on this "surveitlance" aspect has been
undertcren by trr ',;t tf f . For instance, a comprehensive study of the debts of 
the
Third rrlortd had aLready been uritten tvo and a haLf yttt"nol Neverthetess'
ExecutiVe Directors agreed with your Rapporteur that forecasting couLd 
be
improvedandthismatterisaLsodiscussedinthenextsection.
41. tinatty, there is the question of the speed at which the I'il'F' can move'
Frankty, it iS stou, Largely because of the need to negotiate the "packages of
measures" required by conditionatity. Atso, it has increasingty tcnded to nove
- touards mediurn and [onger term tending. It is unsuitabte as an tgent for
providing bridging loans in the earty stages of rescheduLing' This scrious
probIen is aIso discussed betou'
(b) Thc tJorLd Bank
4?. The lntcrnationat Bank for Reconstruction and Devetopmtnt (IBRD)' rrith its
associated lnternationat oevetopm?nt Association 
(IDA) and the separate Inter-
nationaI Finance corporation (IFC), are referred to as the t{orLd Bank' The uortd
Bank,s aim is to raisc tiving standards in LDcs, and (through the IDA) the
poorest oncs in perticuIar, by channel.l.ing resources fron deveLoped countries.
Ihe division of Labour r,rith the I.ll.f. is bLurred; it ha3 been said that' "the
tund is a bank.na tnt Bank is a fund"' GeneratLy speaking' Uor[d Eank finance
isusuaILy(thoughcertaintynota[ways)projectfinance,yhi[etheI.t.l.F.
provides for batance of payments adjustmcnts' Atso, the Eank tends to operate
onaLongertermthantheFund.Thetuoshoul.dthereforebecomptenrentaryand
shouLd be seen to act in paraLtel' in crisis situations' This docs not se?n 
to
have happeneci in the reccnt Liquidity crisis' Your rapPorttur got a stronE
impression, uhen visiting the Bank, that Executive Directors feLt that they had
been negLected during thcae historic events and that thcy regrettcd' uith sone
reason, the manner in rrhich thcir modcst request for an increase in "structurat
adjustment,, resources had becn brushed aside, the potentiaL Lcndcrs ctcarty
feeLing that the I.il.t. had atready lutty used up their avaiLabte good-rit['
This proposed increase coutd have been used for investnrent in nanufacturing and
connerciat projects contributing favourrbl'y to the batance of paynents in quite
a short term-
1 I.n.F. Staff Team- (Nouzad and t{ittians)
Dcvcloping Countries,
External Indcbtedntss of
t{ashington, flaY 19E1
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43.ItisverystrongtytoberecomnendedthatthereshoutdbecLoser
cooperation betyeen the I.Il.F. and tcorLd Bank and that nEtlonaI Treasuries
shor,[d Look at the requirements of their funding iointty so that noney goes
where it can best be used. This consideration also appties to the Regionat
Development Banks (Asian, African, Latin Arnerican)' It is rlso important that
the l/orLd Bank has recentty taken certain decisions vhich vil't nake it easier
forittocofinanceprojcctsinLOCsrithCommerciaIBanks.
(c)TheBlnkforlnt?rnationats,tttIaments(BIS)
4G. The BIS provcd to bc thc lirst line of defence during the tiquidity crisis
of 19E2l1963. The reason for this is iust that it v8s extfGmcty Liquid' It
hoLds large deposits for the Centrat Banks of the llember:' rhich inctude att the
najoilindustriatised countrias. llhen nationat Treasuries vere catted upon to
provide ready money for bridging toans, preparatory to tongcr tern r.escheduting
of inter-gov?fnmentat aftd other debts, thq/ decided that those deposits shouLd be
used, to supptement their oun direct contributions' They entrust€d the task of
fixing the bridging toans to thestaff of thc BIS' Thc progranmc Has briLIiantLy
executed and the yortd oues a considcrabLe debt of thanks to this organisation'
4S.Neverthe[ess,theElsissirnptythecl.earingbankforCentraLBanks.
It is not intendcd nor designcd'to be a tending or reschcduLing 'gtncy and it
has made it quite ctear that the operation rhich it perforned in the Spring of
this ycar uas for once onty and shoul'd not be repeatcd' This raises again the
probLem mcntioned in paragraph 35 above of hov to provide bridging loans in a
future crisis.
(d) The Paris ttub
46. ,,Ctub de Paris" is the nsoc used to dcscribe a spcciat conmittce of oEcD
members trhich neet3 in Paris undcr thc Chairmrnship o{ f' Canbessus to consider
the rescheduling of that part of indebtedaccs vhich Gonsists of Governnent
export credits. The "Ctub" ori.ginaLLy lct onty rrrcty to rcvier thc activities
of the officiaL Grport credit egencies (Exllt 8rnk, ECGD, COTACE, HERHES etc)
but the tiquidity crisis ptaced a hcavy catt on its serviccs and by the niddte
of 19E3 it had rescheduted 12 biLtion of export crcdits, taking one debtor
country aftrr another at separate ocetings. Atthough it onty acts in respect
of Loans nade fron onc govertmcnt to anothcr, its actions ctn strve as signaLs
or teads for private dcbt settlcrncnts rith thc ranc borrorers- Its activities
have been outstandingLy rcLL conducted and it lust be considered a great success'
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(e) CoinmerciaI Banks
4?. h Ereat part of the indettedness reveated in the Iiquidity crisis 
r'as
oweo to Com.ler:iat Banks. By the beginning of 1982, bank toans to 
non-oiI
LDcs amounted to 3 3OO biu.ion, representing morc than 302 of the banks' 
net
externat assets. In their case, no structured machinery existed to deaI 
with
the probLens. As each borrower country asked for rescheduLing of its debts'
angd-lgggroupoftheinterestedtenderswouLdhavetobeconvened'usuat\V
in London or Nev York, to negotiate' Such negotiation usuatLy prored
rather successfut, thdrgh som€times tengthy and painfuL. The tern "London
ctub,,has been used to describe these actiuities but seens to be a 
misnomer'
48. It is not surprising that many comnerciaL Banks have been 
very unwit[ing
to r'lott te.n$..of (eyen more) to advance the additionat credits required for
rescheduling. That they have done so is due in part to governnents 
(and notabty
those of community member states) who have urged the importance of not putting
anyborrouerinthepositionofhavingtodefaul't,rhiteatthesarnetite
refusing to underurite comnerciat Loans' But the major ro[e in persuading
banks to meet their responsibiLit'ies in this way feLL to the I'h'F' Frcn
the start of the crisis towards the end ol 1982, the Fund yorked cLosety rrith
the commerciaL BankS in evatuating situations and hctping then foruard' A
very strong Lead uas then given. To quote the t'lanaging Dircctor of the I'i1'F':
,,The essentiat need for continued Lending on the part of the conrnerciat tsanks
appl.iesnotonl.ytothetargebanksbutaLsotothesmatlerandregionatbanks
as yelt, nhich together noH account for an important part of totaL internationaL
financingftoys.Inthisconnection,uenustseetoitthattheptanned
increases in bank exposure cio actuau,y take place." 
t 
,nts leadership of 
,#.",
the conrnercial fieLd has been vieued (and cven criticised) as an importact' '*;-'
increaseintheauthorityandpoHerofthel.tl.F.Yetitoughtsure[yto
be considered an advantaga that banks shou[d be abLe to look to the 
princiFat
pubtic internationat source of funds for infornration' guidancc and support'
49.Theprobtcmsuhicheocrgedduringthecrisisperiodraisedbroadquestiqns
of thc responsibiLities of banks to their depositors and borrouers' to each
otherandtotheeconomicsysteaasarrhole.Iftheygotintoreallydeep
r,8ter, shortd thcy be bail.ed out? Uas a higher dgree of nonitoring of their
activities by Goucfflcnts or internatioa'l-'tuthorities desirab[e? tlhv had
nationct ctqpt f.aa4l grt'ovcd such r 'rcny poor guide to thc terrders and uhy
J. Gle LaROsiere. speech to the Aanuat Flecting of Reserve city Bankers'
Boca Raton- 9 ilaY 1983
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L'ere they unauare of the
by individual LDCs and of
involved? An attemPt is
piecie extent and structure of borroring
the poLiticat, as HeLt as financial risks
nade bLotr to answer these questions-
50.Thisbodyisdesignedtoprovidemachineryfordealingt|iththelast
of thcse probtems - scarcity of banking inforrnation in the private sector' 
It
lras sct up after study of thc requirement at a Ditchtey conference in 1982'
There yere 35 {ounder nembtrs, repre3cnting a setection of principaL banks from
ten different countries. The intention vas that nenbership be extended to embrace
manybanksfronattcountries.AtrcadyithaslEOnclbersofvhichnostarebanks'
though sonc insurance companibs are incLuded. Thc Institutt shouLd bc function-
ing by earty nert Ycar (I98{)'
5l.Thefunctionsofthisbodygittbetoprovidetheprivatesectorr,ith
information, country by country. It ritt hoLd vo[untary discussions vith
borrorer,s about their debt pl,ans. It viIL exchange information vith the I'til'F.,
t{orLd Bank and 8IS. It uitt provide its members rith evatuations' It is
reltayareofthereluctanceofl'cnderstodigct3ssonaaspcctsoftheirprobtims
and of the doubts of targe banks about the vatuc (and confidentiatity) of
an organisation uhich yil.[ cmbracc so many snalter fry' But the founders
aetieved that they coutd crcate an cffectivc private-sector nechanisn to improve
internationaL risk tending and orderLy capitaL narkets, thus hetping to Linit
the tikeLihood of future crises by nudging the parties in tine. As [lr tliItiam
09den, the original. interim chairman, put it to your Rapporteur: "No f€ci Lights and
no green tights - onty anber!"
(o) Conctusion
,2. A revien of atL the above errangements, cotbined vith the constant ca[endar'
of Econonic Surunitr, intetainistcriat meetings, intcrnationat connittecs o1
Treasury officirts and othcr3, and thc actlvltios of avcry sort of privatc
rndpubl.ic,nationetandintcrnrtionetorganarrd.cntity,suggcststhatUc
.c.rtainLy have enough aachinc-qy. To create rorl'r6uta bc usetess dr'pticatioe'
t{hat is needed is bctter orgtnlration of thc rchtionships bctueen thc parts,
bettcr capabitity and perfornance rhcre this has be:n scen to be reak and
clear guideLines as to yhat is trpectcd. -It is particutadv- decirabte- to-
encour?ge increased co-financinc betveen internationat institutions, IllF,
UOriA Bahk'<ir'Rbiionat Devetopnent Banks, and syndlcated Coonerefit-Bairks,
nith rnonitoring by the former.
53. There is, horever, one rather obvious faiting. tlhereas the uortd of
lenders is organised from top to botton, the rortd of borrouers is pictaaeal
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and disorganised. Neither UNCTAD nor the Group of ?? have throun up an institution
or committee, capabte of deaLing trith organiscd tending in the xay inohieh
0pEC deats uith the rest of the tlorl'd over oiL' This nay have made things
easier for the [enders and (as already noted) the differing probtens of the
borrouers have required individual. treatncnt. But, in the long run' it is
an unheaLthy situation if borrouers do not consuLt vith each other in a frec
and sophisticated manner. The recrininations vhich arose betveen Brazit end
Mexico at thc height of the tiquidity crisis il"l'ustrate thie point' It uoutd be
a great advance if UNCTAD Here to mute its cries and turn its attcntion to this
requirement in a mature and constructive uay.1 the flnaL reconaendationt of
the recent New OeLhi Confercnce of.Unatigned countrics pcrhaps contains the seeds
'z
of a sotution-
D. Prob[ems of Debt filanaoement
54. Some of the probtems throun up in
resoLved uhi Le others remain uide open'
th i s sect ion.
2 Seventh Confemace of Heads of
New Dethi, ilarch 1983; Action
the Last Year are on the raY to be'ing
The more obvious ones are discussed in
55. Conditio;.,al.itv. It is pLain cnough that thare can be no intcrnationat
credit system which is not based on confidcnce that toans viLt be sensibty and
profitabLy used and that servicing is assured. such confidence has not altrays
been the case in the past and, as thiS report has tried to shor, that uaS one of
the undertying causes in the,rapid detcrioration of thc financiat viabil'ity of
LDcs. After a crisis such as yG have undcrgone, the confidence of the lcnding
comrnunity must be restoied if finance is to flor again' 0thcruise' adcquate
capitaL uitt not be forthcoming to fund thc t.n.F. and uortd Sank or as toans
from comnerciat Banks. Thjs neens that cach debtor Gountry nust bc seen to be
naking a credibte cffort to put its house in order, in such a uay as to be abte
to service its externaL debt. This is an incscapabto requirernent and it has
faIten to the I.t4.F. to negotiatc the "packagcs of ncasures" vhich ritt provide
the necessary confidence. Thcsb packagcs arc thGrcfore conditionaI for
rescheduted debts and ncY loans'
1 committee for External Retations. Opinion on-the Report o! !h! conmittee
for DeveLop..ni-.na Cooperation on U'ltCtAg conference (PE 65.t09)
State or Government of ll'on-atigned Countries:
Programma, Scctien C(c)
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56- l.lany nembers of the partiament have argued that I.tt.t. conditions are often
too onerous. The dangers of domestic pol.iticaL strains vhich may be caused
have been underIined in this report and require the greatcst understanding and
skil.Is from ihe 0irector Generat and his staff. Your Rapporteur believes that
these have normatty been shoun in the past and that Governnents represented in
the ,,Group of 10,. shoutd not intervene or attempt to inftuence such negotiations-
But they do have a duty to takc notc of the agrecnrents conplet€d and to decide if
they are in the true interests of the I.l.t.F. and of thr recipients of the toans-
Those Govermrents are responsibte for the appointncnt of the I.t'1.F. Directors and
senior staff and that shouLd be a sufficient safegrurrd.
57. A country in batance of payments ciifficutties has no choice but to rexijust.
If the conditions of readjustment appear to sone govcrnmcnts of tender countries to
be harsh or dangerous, they have the option of easing the strain thm4h speciaL exFrt
credits and bil.ateraL or mult'iLatrraI dcvelopncnt aici prograltmas. This is atso
an esscntiaL roIe for the t{ortd 8ank.
58. SurveiItance. The Lesson uhich has been univcrsat[y draun from rtcent
events has been that a better earty-uarning systcl is requircd and'thet the
provision of infornation about patterns of indebtcdness must be greatty inproved.
,tot onty r,rust the I.H.F. have a firner grasp of thc facts but the knortecigt nust
be sharecj yith the community of Connercial, Banks. Atthough these tro parties
have different functions anci objectives, their ectivitics coutd be better
coordinated yith mutuaI advantagc. l Such sharcd tnovLccigc is needed not onty to
give earty uarning of troubte but atso to ensurc a rltional attocation of
resources. It shouLd atso hel,p to dampen srings of gcntinent for or against
individuaL borroyers and prevent "setf-futfitting" prophccies (i.c. prophecies
.that a country riLL run into difficutty vhich daoagc its crcdit-vorthiness
and so increase the Likal,ihood of its bcing in dcftutt).2 Onc can cven sce the
possibitity of',pre-enptivr rescheduting". At thc sanc tine care vitI have to be
taken that improved snoothness of rescheduting and the favourabte fina.nciaI terns
'offered to borrowers in difficu[ties do not tead to attempts by credit-uorthy
countries to ctaim the same priviteges for thelsetvcs and strain the'vho[e
structure of Lending rates rortdvide'
59. The I.il.F. has nou given nuch attention tb strGngthcning this surveittancp
r-rr'1s, particutarty to monitor debt poLicics. It vi[[ provide technicat assistanca
in setting up machinery in member countries yhich viLt hetp thcr to controt
1 Fo. an iLLuminating discussion of this aspect sec: Grahao Bird; Thc Bants
and the I.tl.F. - Oivision of Labour; Lloyds Bank Rcvicr ]lo 150r.0ctober 19&l
)
' Anthony F. Sotomon (President of Federal Reserve Sank) Addrcss to th!
InternitionaI Centre for ].tonctary and Eanking Studies (pagc 9) Gencva, E.(.E!
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externat borrouing; it triLL compite and pubLish statistics on externaL debt; it
nitI inprove cooperation and exchange of information rith the t,,orLd Bank, BIS
and nationaI authorities. l,lost important of atI is the circulation oi this
knouledge throughout financiaI markets and for this the Fund yiIt cotlaborate
with the IIF as being the chosen instrument of surveittance in the private
banking sector. The IIF has a highLy inportant part to ptay.
60. Ctearly, there are problerrs of confidentiatity for both the I.tt.F. and IIF.
Information vi[[ not be forthcoming for either institution untess the wishes of
those uho provide it are respected. Both have agreed to be guided by those
yishes as regards.the use and release of information.
61. BridoinE loans. These short tern arrangements yere the essentiat first step
in deaLing with the Liquidity crisis. They were provided by nationaI Treasuries
and the BIS rhite the tonger term vehictes of the I.tl.F. and the Comrtercial
Banks vere being trundled into tction. They are unl.ikeLy to be avaiLabte in the
future. As has been noted, the I.H.F. cannot provide them. The BIS has decLined
to repeat the exercise. As far as the US Treasury is concerned, the Deputy
Assistant Secretary, ttlr ltlark Leland, toLd your Rapporteur: "There wil,L be no
further bridging loans of any kind". hrithout the US, the rest of us wiLt not get
very far. It is therefore essential, that the surveiItance system, discussed in
the previous paragraphs, be so effective as to make surprise impossibLe and to
atLov aIt rescheduLing to start at the medium-term stage. One must hope that
this can be achieved. If not, no doubt, sone adequate reaction wiLL be devised
but it vould be very h,rong to use that assumption as an excuse for neg[ect.
62. Guarantees to Banks. During the initiaL shock of the Liquidity crisis, it
was feared that some banks might find themselves in over-extended positions trhich
coutd not be restored by normat conmerciat means. It uas beLieved that one or
two such bankruptcies rou[d produce a "card-house effect" tdhich wouLd spread
rapidLy, through a catting-in of inter-bank loans, and destroy the nhote system.
It was suggested by some that governments shouLd guarantee setected high-risk
loans or even aLt additionaL connercia[ loans necessary for rescheduLing arrange-
ments. The most fundamenta[ proposal yas for the creation of a ne], intergovern-
mentaI finance institution uhich routd take over from the banks al.L loans to LDCs.
Fortunate[y, the immediate crisis ]ras averted yithout the need for underwriting
of any loans by either the l.ttl.F. or by governments.
63. The prevai.Ling vieu on this question uas that commerciaL banks must operate
at their own risk. Removat of that risk youtd aLso remove any reaL financiat
discip[ine. During the phase of rapid credit expansion, commerciaI Loans had been
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very profitabte and that.rp"nrion uoutd [:e dangerousty acceterated if the risk
element trere removed. It can be said that the security of the commerciat banks
has been adequateLy underpinned by the action of thc I'l'l't' in ?ntering into
;:int reschedulir.: , -rlngements sith high d'inditionatity and a stro.ger system of
surveiItance. Your Rapporteur does not betieve that formaI guarantees of any
kind shouLd be Provided'
61. Trade and Lendino. tt has been noted in paragraoh 54. that the msssive
Lending that has taken place has not been reflected in a comparable inprovenent
in the trade performance of LoCs. This aspect has becn Of p'rticular conccrn to
GATT. The Director-Generat, llr Arthur DunkeLdreu repeated .tt?fition to the
fact that recovery from the debt crisis could not take ptaca in the face of any
increase of hlesiarn resistancc to Third tlortd exports. ' He has atso draun attention
to contradictions in the present systen of al,Locating resourccs' For instance'
the huge recent investment of externaL capitat in Brazi['s steet-nrking industry
coutd be totatLy Hasted as a resutt of r"estern resistance to steet lniports'
,'r,.;estern Eanks are paying for lJestern proteCtiOni3n"'1 AnOther ObviOuS exanpte
is Japanese investment in Koree-
65. In thslOng run, the soLution to these probtens nust lie 
in narket forces
and the rristoricat atLocation of ccrtain ctarscs of production to devetoping and
newty industriatising countrlcs. But meanrhi[c, thcre are inportant decisions
on resource-aLLocation being taken each veek rithout fuLL rcgaid to future trade
consequences. Hclrcrrer, for scnre tjne novl Gem has been reqularly repnesented
by an obse4rer at neetings of the Interim Ccnrnlttec and tlre SecrretarY-Gerleral
and his staff enjoy a close rcrking relaticrship with tJte I.li'F'
c,6- gigsg!-Iny9g!89!!. ProbLems of debt scrvice rou[d be reduced if a higher
proportion of deveLopment capitat for the LDcs uas in the form of equity invest-
ment instead of loans. This aspect tends to be overlooked' The oistrust of
muLtinationats in sone LDCs aild the reciprocal mistrust of many internationat
companies for the rel.iabitity of the administrations in receiving countries have
grave[y danagcd this channet of grouth. Neverthetess, virtuaIty thc uhote of
productive capacity in the Third tlortd today has been achievcd uith the partici-
pation of US, European and Japanese direct investrtnt'
1 Arthur Dunke[. Address
London,
RoyaL lnstitute of Internationat Affairs
ilarch 1965.
to
22
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6?, partiament has al.ready examined this problern.l It cannot be said tE
the various "codes of conduct" ha\E resolved it, though they.have no doubt hetped
considerabty. A comprehensive approach to the vhoLe probLem vas recentLy set out
by the president of the United Slates himsel.f.2 This is a good basis for further
consideration by 0ECD and the t'lortd Bank, as weLL as the various Regiona[
r .:7et;5.11s6t Banks. l,lethods of improving the f [ov of di rect investment shoutd be
studieo as a matt?r of urgencY.
68- tnterest Rates. FinatLy, the most important aspect of att is the tevet of
interest rates. Increase's in industriaI production and a recovery in vortd tracie
yiLL not be enough to prevent ner faitures of tiquidity in one country after
another if thc burden of servicing eartier debts renains too high. 14. de Larosiere
has pointed out that present interest ratcs in the scven [argest economies are
5t above infLation rate and has exprassed the viev that 2I uould be enough.3
Uhatever the proper 9ap, it is ctear that these rates are being determined
unitateral.ty in Washington and your Rapporteur has atready expressed the vieu that
US budgetary deficits are going to be an insuperabte obstacLe to any sizeabte fatt
in interest.rates for some time to come. The community has a duty, because of
Soth exchang€ rate and yortd debt conSidcrttions, to continue prtssing for the
eartiest improvement.
E - tuture Out took
6d.. In the tast year, the uorLd has surnounted a debt crisis of the very gravest
nature rithout a cottapse of financiat oarkets. lluch remains to be cjone' Some
of the contributions ptedged to the I.l4-F- are stiLt outstanding' lmportant
rescheduting exercises are stiLL uncompteted' Some countries vhich have been
hetped over their immediate probLens t,iLt be back vith their troubtes again wittr-m
t91o years. The confidence of thc banking comnunity has becn badLy shaken' ltlo$t
inportant of aLL, the totat exposure of the.c-omnerciaL Banks is extraordinarity
high. Some US banks have been in troubte.anci conmunity banks are very vutnerabLe 1
any disorder in the us banking system. There harre been ccrplaints by Dorro"ers
about what they consider to be the very high charges nade by conrercial Banks for
their participation in rescheduling. lltrere is also a dangerous lack of prudence
qr the part of sfie banks v*rtrich are reluctant to face up to sharehol&rs and
writedorlmunsatisfactoryloarrsontheirbalarrcesheets.
70. Neverthetess, there arQ a feu slgns of Spring. ,n: most recent enalysis of
Third Wortd indebtedness shovs a distinct settting doun'- It aP!'ears that LDCs
yitthavecutdoHntheiraggreg.telalancgofpeyarntsdeficitbTttrecndofthis
2
5
4
Caborn Report on Enterprises and GOvernments in-InternationaI Econom'ic
Activity. Resotuiion bl C 267 ot 9 November 1981, pages 254
president Reagan. statement on US Investment Poticy: Uashington, 9'9'E3
J. de Larosiere. stattncnt to French foreign trade sympositn' 7'12'83
prof essor ,iti tLiam cLine. Internationat Dcbt and the Stability of the tlortd
Econoary: uashington, Autrum lt5 PE EE.176/f in.
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year to S67 biLLion in contrast uith E110 bilLion for 1981. As already noted,
the ratio between debt service payrnents and exports has come dovn from 24I
to 19l^, though for some it remains much higher (see paragraph 9). Ithat debtor
countries can do for thernsetvcs uiLt be greatty heLped by gencraI developments
lf tlf Ul.rlfi"! errlltirt lhe tatest forecast for grourth in this sector is
3.5I for 1984 and this couLd l,ead to a 4.5I expansion of vortd trade. The l.il.f.
considers that every increase of 17. in gronth in industriatised countries neans
$35 biLLion more erports for LDCs. Atthough thtsc figures are atI open to
chaILenge, the trend is encouragilg. Neverthetess, the need for a fatL in
interest rates remains paranount.l
i
v. EURoPEAN I'IoNETARY CooPERAT[0|{
A. Scope for Coooeration
71. In the circumstances described in Sections II to IV of this report each
major industriatised cconomy or group of econonies shouLd strive to nrake its
best contribution to internationaI stabitity, recovcry and grovth. tle have seen
that certain aspects of US financia[ poticy (negtect of exchange rate problems,
higher intercst rates) and of Jrpanese poticy (ncgtect of capitat aovements)
have damaging effccts. Is thc Conmunity doing eny better and is it excrting its
fuIL strength?
7?. The capabitities of the EEC are obvious enough. Vieued as a single unit,
it has the Largest manufacturing capacity in the llorLd. Its innovative powers'
are unequaLLed. Its externat and internal trade accounts for more than 302 of
the Hortd,s exchange of goods and services. Its llembers hoLd one third of aLt
foreign exchange resources and hatf of total gotd resources. It has three
currencies trhich, to a greater or lesser degree, are used as reserves or for
trading- But it is at once obvious that the Conm,rnity can only cxert its fult
effective ueight on the intcrnationat financial scene if its poticies and efforts
are co-ordinated and its currencies can operatt as one. Sucli requirenents are
recognised in the TrcatY of Roac.
73. Articte 105 of the Treaty set up the Europaan Cornnunityrs !gOg!gCf-9ggUi!!SS-
(ECI{C) to report regutarty or to detiver opinions to the Councit and Conrnission
on the nonetary and financial *ituations of the tlcrber States and their general
payments sysiems. This Coonittee oeets about once a Donth in'Brussets and
satisfactority futf its its furrtions. Ho;E\ter, its prreedings are
c.f. Report to the European Partiament by tir ll. ALBERT and Professor R.J. BALL,
"Tor.ards fi-uropean Economic Rccovery" : scction 55
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strictLy confidentiaL and Partiament is therefore unaHare of the scope and aims
of its discussions at any time. t.tithout trishing to disturb this systen (vhich
is no doubt rather comfortabte for nationaI Treasuries and the commission) the
Economic and iorer:-y committee of the Partiament might Like to invite the
Chairman of the Eetttc to appear before it to exptain tne approach of his Cornnittce
toHards the tasks atLocated to it'
B. The Europcan monetary System (EilS)
74. The ma.in thrust of European financiat cooperation is through the EMS' It is
on the satisfactory {unctioning of this system that the forcc and quatity of the
Comrnunity,s contribution to internationaL financiaL stabiLity depends- Further-
more, the EtilS is itseLf intended to be a potent unifying force vithin the
Connunity. Tfpre had been no major study of the systern bv Parlianent sirrce
'l-
early 19801 until the recent appearance-of the Hennan reporto. Hooever, th€
situation is knoum to Members and there is no need to recapltulate earlier
history. The present situation is as follows :-
(i) trlhereas the EMS uas orig'inal.Ly set up as a neP approach to European
econonic integration, the pers'istent (and sometimes increasinE)
divergencies betyeen the economies of the trlember Strtes have preventdd
such progress and have reduced the ro[e of the Et'lS large[y to that of
regutating mutuat exchange rates
(ii) In this tjnited fietd., the Exchange Rate ilechanism (ERF!) has provcd.
rather successfuI and has considerabt.y improved short-tcrn stabititt.
There has also been scme success in oreventing
unnecessary currency movements against the nediun-ttfm trend (cf. thr
Dlil/FF retationshiP in 19E1).
(iii) There has been an almost totat absencc of any joint poticy tovards the
doLLar. The resuLt has been that the Deutschcmarlg as tht Stro4gcst
currency in the EMS, has become the medium of the relationship. Thc
absence of ster['ing is considered by many to be a notable disedvrntlgc.
The achievem?nt of a proper joint Cornmunity basis for rn ERll/t relrtlon-
ship and for deating uith the US (and Jrpancse) ronatery luthoriticst
tht outstanding need of the noment-
(iv) The tack of progress touards economic intcarrtion is reflectcd in the
faiture to move toyards strge 2 of thc El{s. A n{or ncr initietive in
this directiqr ril.t be neccssary if the lErber $trtes rgrtc thrt thcy
wish to make Progress.
Ruffoto Rcport
pp. 56-59
Doc. I-I251l83
of 11.4.1980. Resotution in Ruffoto Rcport 0J C 117 of 12.5.19E0
adoPted 
-bv -PIenarY on 1€J-1984'
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75. Recommendations from the Parl.ianent concerning internationaI 
financia[
stabiLity cannot be of nuch significance un[ess acconpanied by suggestions for
improved nonetary cooperation rithin the Community' Apart from the genera[' tong-
Ierrl requiremerrts for 9r€-ii]'Convergence and strengthening Of the internaI market
as a preparation for nonetary union, there are tHo crucia.l probtems nceding
jmmediate attention - first, UK participation in thc EltS and second, the inter-
natiohaL rotc of the ECU-
c- uK itembershio of the El'lS
76. Whi1e British nenbership of the EltS since its fornding has prored helpful and
constnctirure, the view has been widely eloressed in ottler parts of the CCnnrunity
that refusal by sueessive British CoverrmBnts to take part in thE Em't haE
seriously rcakered the systan. Ttris view has been based on the afreaeY-{Ipsttfied
absence of a cqnrcn Cotrrunity policy totlard.s the &Ilar and the belief that
Europe urould be in a much stronger position to deal with npnetary auttroritiee in
the US and Japan, as nrall as to er{ert greater influence in internatimal
financial institutions, if they qerated a comrn o<change rate policl' - e\ren
rpre so, if they lrere to mcve on to a ccnupn currency in the second stage of the
E!,IS. 
, 
Nthough the British Gorrcrruent have stated on serreral Gcasions that they
are in principle in far,pur of fully joinirg in the E<change FtaLe I'Echanisn, they
have advarrced a nunber of reasons (not unirrersally shared in the U.K.) fon not
doing so. ItE rnain ones have been the difficulty of reconciling enchage rate
targets with nurey-srryply targets, the status of sterling as a "petro-currency"
and the different reactions of sterling and the D!,1 to shifts in the internationil
value of the dcllar. In&ed, the British fleasurlz has nerrer judged the dollar/
sterling/deutsctmark rate to be right for fuIL British entr?. llhese ar$rEnts
appear to scne critics to wa:< and ware aceording to the oceasion, givi'nq the
inpression that political consideratiqrs are elerting ttre real pull. The na"in
political factor in nind is that of sovereignty, but qte is tcrpt-ed to ask what
is so sorrcreign in a currenclz (sterting) that has depreciated by 60t tn three
years and has been fonced to relinquish npst of its interrntiqral role to tbe
pn4? In any case, there are otter political argrents besides sorereignty, and
they do not Snint in the sane directiqr.
77. In the @urse of the last year, the eitieh Hotrce of f-ords calried out the.
npst exhaustive and auttroritatirie exatinatiqr of this problerr Erblished to darcI.
Ttris concludes with ttre rords: 'Ite Ccnmittee believes that thot4fi exact timi.ng
1
' House of Lords. Se[ect Comittce
European tlon?tary Systen. London-
on the Eurogean Comunitics. 5th Pcport:
26.7.1 983
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DrJst rqErrd @ general goverrurEnt poricy, the balarrce of advantage lies in earry]**' 
. '
though rpt necessarily funrediate, entrY". The British corrc,"uBnt did not accept
tne reoorrendatiml in respect of the need for early actiqr- ltris Parliarent has
,..oftgr elpressed the hee that the tx covernnent rcuId fuide to join' In fact'
the pnesent state of the Connunity is rpt such as to erEdrrage Inajor &cisions
by the LB( tqrards inproved ooqeration. Parlianent, tto*errer, wiII rp doubt wish
totakealcrgervi,ewarrdrrrgethatthernatteroffullBritishparticipationbe
krept nn&r @nstant review in the hae that it can be achieried at an early stage-
D- The ECU
7A. use of the ECU as the naster currency of Eurcr has developed slsvty but has
made'strides sincc it vas tast considered in the Ruffoto Report' Thc present
situation is. as fot[oYs:
(i) The Ecu is universeLLy accepted by a[[ connunity institutions as a unit
of account '
(ii)Asameansofsettlerrentbetyeenmembercountries,itsusehasbeen
timited.forinstance,ontyl?-lstofrepaymentsofvSTFcreditshas
been made in ECU. Transfers in and out of ECU have been votatite' pre-
sunrabl.y to take advantage of exchange rate variations'
(iii) In the privatc sector, deposits have groun rather faster' At the end of
this year, there shouLd be about 1.5 and 2 bittion ECU respectivety in
privatety denoninated deposits and toans' :
(iv) The ECU has risen to third place as a denomination for Euroborrd loans,
yhich continue to increase although they stiIL represent onty about 4z
of totat such issues' (See Annex 6)' -
(v)AfeucompanieshavestartedinvoicinginECU.Notabl'y,theseinclude
sone Japanese multinational's. This practice ought to appeal to nany
nore firns as an insurance against exchange rate and intercst rate
f [uc tuat i ons '
Tg.AltturghtheEl,hasnotyetachierredthewi&spreadrrsecigirrallytrctrndfor,
it is mre tpPular than its internaLid'l rival' the ltrlFrs sDR' tfiich 
aPpe'rrs to
harc ca,sed scr* sur[rrise in wastrirgtsr. rn the ]anger tem, it sturrd 
be' tj]e
basisfctteissrreofacmrritlrbar'krEtesarrdforamrldreservearrdvetticle
.,rzen.,, tiat 6,,d infrrsre &cisidls abdrt tjre &rlar erctrarq' ard interesc
rates. rcarr*rire, ttERe are a rnder of trnints td}ictl shoild be 
qrsi&red as nays
r.ir
of irseasfug ttE use of tJe El:
I rUr=" of Lords- Eansald, 14'Il'L983' o1s' 1138-1142
2 Sorr,o", San Pelo rw Letster tib' 6' Septelfier 
1983
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(i) iost ioportant is the conctusion as soon as possible of arrangeoglt3
for an ECU cLearing systen for corunerciat banks. This, like ctearanCc
for cenrral banks of their ECtlfinancial operation, uiLt be handtcd tt
the 8IS. It ShouLd hciJ lne ftou of ECU as a neans of setttenent'
This shouLd be fottoued by active canvassing through banks of thc
advantages of ECU invoicing by private companies'
(ii).uhiLe it noutd be unyise to ask that creditor governoents shoutd accetrt
looz repayncnts in ECUs, there shoutd be nore deliberatc pressure to
acccpt EGUs for OfficiaL setttements above thc prcsent 502 rate'
(iii) There 3houtd be a serious effort to spread the use of the ECU to intcr-'
governnental and interinstitutional, transactions uith countrlcs outsidc
the CommunitY.
(iv) The rote of the European tonetary Cooperation Fund (FECOI{), uhich is
neant to supcrvise the exchange operations and settlenents of the El{S,
is in fact rather innateriat. It has deLegated its operatinE porers to
the BIS and does not appcar to pubtish its oxn accounts. Your rlPporteur
cannot say uhat takesptace at its lonthLy meetings and the Econoeic and
Irtonetary Comittee of Par[iaaent night care to invite the Secretary
Generat to report on the uork of thc organisation and to revcat uhether.
it is in a position activel.y to strcngthen the rote of thc eco-
EU. In addition to the above, the Coarnission has itsetf proposed to the Councit
certain basic administrative il?asurQ3 to give grcater Gurrcncy to thc ECU in the
1private sector. These are the subicct of a notion for a resotutionz on uhich
there has not yet been any rcport. Partianent vitt nodoubt vish to sec urgent
action taken on this.
VI FUTURE ACTIOII
A- itotion for a Resotution
8i. This report has reachcd certain broad conctusions m the sr.rbjects of
f inanciat instabiLity and Corunity trade.
tt Eu.op""n Gnission- Cmmicetion to the Councit xo. 715elE3 (ECOFII| 55),
24.5-1983
2 oo.- 1-Ez6rEr (PE 86.986,
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(i) VoLatitity in foreign exchanges' inhibits both trade and investment..
(ii) Instabil.ity arising from itIiquidity in Third Uortd countries restricts
'.,:ir ahiIity to trade and puts pressure on industriaLised c6rntiiis]to'
import nore and export [ess- 
,t . .:.. 
-;
(iii) FinanciaL instabititygives rise to stridentdeoands for proiictionism-
(iv) In the above three respects, the [rlember States of the Community sh6utd,
not expect to suffer more than other industriatised countries.
,,.']
(v) Neverthetcss, the refusat of the United Statcs to address itseLf to -;
exchange rate problems and their insistence on maintaining very high.;
rates of interest throughout the recession and the tiquidity crisis"tiave
been a major factor in s[ouing recovery and have thrown an extra burden onto
the CommutniY.(vi) The Community uoutd be in e stronger position to inftuence uorLd
financiat and monetary cv"nts if it could realise the origina[ aims of
t he EftlS.
g2. The detaiLs of this report have been concerned with the mechanisns of the
above probtems. Equatty, the draft resotution seeks to advance uays of deating
urith then. For the reasons given in the veryfirst paragraph of this report, your
rapporteur has sought to avoid sueeping generaI recommendations in favour of pre-
cise ideas and practicaI neasures.
B. The Economic Recovery of the EEC
g5. It uiLL be seen that the ideas and conctusions in this report in no Hay con-
fLict with those contained in tlre report of tilr BatI and Professor ALbert; indeed,
they uoutd appear to support and comp[enent them in a[t respects. Both reports
are based ontheneed for an increasingty united Europe, as opposed to "non-Euroge')
and on the beLief that ue shoutd treat our probLcms as opportunities to increase
cooperation rather than to indutge our differences'
g4.1r1r gal.t and professor ALbert deaLt onty rather generat[y uith financiat
and monetary probLems, though Chapter 5, Section 55, discusses the subject at
some tength- It is recommended, therefore, that the tuo reports be considered
together and that this document be sent to the temporary speciat committee, set
up by the decision of the European ParIianentrl for urgent consideration as part
of the "ReLance Economique Europeen".
1 
,no,ion f or a resotution Doc- 1-569/83 2 6.?.1983.
1 7. 10. 1983. P. 1 3I'
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Absolute percenrage chang,es in daily
exchange rrccs against US dollar
1. Deutsche !'lark
ANNEX I
IEA*
1973
r974
1975
1976
L977
1978
t979
19E0
t9E 1
1982
YTAR
197 3
r974
19 75
L976
L977
197E
t979
1980
1961
19E2
3. Pstrnd
YEAR
1973
L9 t'4
19 75
L976
t977
197E
t979
1990
198 I
1982
number of
observations
of which:
larger than
I per cent.
2. Japanese yen
237
214
249
254
252
2s3
251
252
251
253
nusrber of
observations
237
244
24E
251
249
250
2s0
249
250
249
4L
24
9
I
7
39
11
27
62
37
of which:
larger than
I per cent.
t2
15
0
0
3
42
17
36
31
56
sterli.ng
of which:
nuober of larSer than
obsevations I per cent.
253
253
254
255
?52
252
253
254
2'>2
253
6
10
5
22
6
22
2l
l(,
57
28
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Volatility of dollar rates
--:-l:---:--
Avcrage daiiy : Saoe as left
pcccntEte change : adjustcd for
vfu-a-vis: : trend factor
, z the perlod
:
Dll Yen Pound : Dtl
.--?a
Yon
.24 | .49
.30 : .46,
.23,. i .34
.36 : .lt
.14 : .23
.43 : .50
.42 : .30
.37 ' ': .!+2
.65 . ": .57'
.46 : .53
Annex II
-)
the
durin!
FoundIrEAR
t97l
r914
1975
1976
r971
l97E
1979
!,9E0
1901
1et2
.56
.50
.37
.ta
.2S
.55
.33
.47
.73
.55
.23
.2E
.14
.13
.26
.55
.46
.52
.)5
.64
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ANSIEX III
Exanples of oajor swirigs in real effective erchaq3e ratesr
slnce 1975
f. US doller 
f
Dcc. 1975 to Oct. 197E -f7.0
Oct. l97t to Dec. f9E2 +38.3
2. Drutschr ler},.
Drc. 1915 to Dcc. 1979 +15.9
Dec. 1979 to Dec. 1982' -15.0
3. JepancEo yGn
Jan. 1975 to Aut. 1978 +39.E
Aut. t97E ro Feb. 1980 -35.1
Fcb. l9E0 to Feb. 19tl +25.4
Feb. 19Ef to Oct. 1982 -19.8
4. Pound sterling
Apr. 1975 to Oct. f976 -15.5
Oct. 1976 to Jan. 1961 +6E.2
Jrn. fgEl Eo Dec. l9E2 -14.0
(*) Eff.ctlvc oxchangc rete adjustcd for dlffcrGncas in the oovements
of lndustrial rholcsale price indlces.
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ANNEX IV
Noo-OIl lhvelqplry Countrics: Extcrnel I}cbt, lg73-tl I
(Ia billioas of U.S. doltrn)
Toarl ogtstrdla3 deEt of no.oll
&vclofl4 ooutlet
Sborl.tcro debt
Loo3.tcro dcbt
By q2c ol crcditor
Oficial crcdilors
Govctrmeott
'hrtiooel isrtirutioos
Privuc crtditon
Uryuuatccd &bt
Guerentccd'dcbt
Fiauciel iortitutious
Othcr privetc crrditors
By radyticrl goup
Nct oil crportcE
Nct oil importcn
Mejor crporrcrs of
areaufectucs
Lov-iicomc conotrics
Otber act oil ioportc6 r
By irer
Atrice
Asir
Europc
Middlc Eest
Wcrtcra Hcmispberc
u0.t l60t t90.t 22t.0 77t.,5 3363 !r.t $15 5sS.0 612.1 66{3
It.4 22.7 27.3 3r.2 12.t 19.7
r r r.t t3t.t t63.J t9..9 215.9 2t6.6 5t.l t5.5 rvt.z tt2.7 97.133t.1 3t8.5 .l52.t 499.6 571.6
Jt.o 60.r17.3 a3.aD.7 16.6
60.t 77.929.3 36.0
t r.5 42.0t7.3 2s.6t4.2 t6.3
20.1 26.09t.{ I l2.l
'rc.t 51125.1 29.72t.2 30.6
11.2 t7.730.0 ,1.6t,1.5 17.2
r.7 10.34.1 5t.2
70.3 t2.450.3 57.920.3 24.t
95.t I l4.t
.0.t 45.952.1 66.615.7 49.0t7.6 l9.t
12.1
152.5
71.-t
3t.3
at.t
21.9 26.939.t a6.'t20.0 2r.1r3.3 16.l6t.6 t2.0
9t.7 I17.557.6 79. t
3 t.0 3t.4
t37.3 t69.t
J r.a 56.4t5.9 tt7-759.t 19.526.t 33.2
53.3 6t.21t2.7 225.4
tJ: tot.t
a5.s 5!.t5r.0 u.2
35.0 ' 42.t
s7.9 0.12t.7 3t.220.1 21.794.0 I14.!
Br.0 t52.9t7.2 9t.7/tS.t 
-r4.2
20t.r 23t.667.1 17.5
r37.t t5t.l
r02.9 12t.634.9 
'6.5
70.5 n.l
257.6 309.1
t27.7 115259.' 67.0t0.,1 96.9
$.e 55.t75.1 tt.,a49.0 57.52t.1 32.9t3r.l ts1.7
t72-1 t93.2 2tt.7
r0t.6 t20.a t3r.363.t 1Z.t $.3
2t0.. 306.4 l$.096.7 103.9 I13.7I$.7 202.2 239.3lu.s t59.5 193.t39.2 1L7 rrj
60., 67.1 75.0tm.t il5.1 t3t.763.'1 69.2 73.t35.4 39.3 1r.7t92.6 20t.9 217.1
l,a.l
t29.1
60.9
t3.2
35.!
95.5 tot.r l29J)356.2 39t.5 425
170.6 tt{.3 2tz.l73.0 lo.r ,0.t
112.1 r27.r t39..
Sourccr: World Burl, Dcbtor Rcportia3 Syrtcsr; urd Fund rtefi cstimrtct rnd proicctiorrrI For ctrssifcetion of couauhs il gutpr sbowo hcre, rce tbe iouoductioo to ihir rppcodh. Erctudcs drte tor tbc Pcople'r RcpuHic
of Chinr Drior to 1977.
r Middlehcooc ouotrhr thet, in 3cacnl, crport oehly priErry coanoditier.
Frcnr International ltrnetary E\:nd l{or1d Econcnric O:tlook, p.200, Washington DC, 1983
-51 PE 86.1781tin./Ann.IV
Extcrad Debt
Non-Oil Developing Couatrics: Long-Term and Short-Term Extcmd Dcbt Relatiue to Expcl
end toGDP,l973slr
(Io pcr ccat)
l97J l97t 
"976
t971 r97t t979 t980 r9il l9t2 l9t 3
Rrdo ol rr&rod d.Dt b crpct
of 3oods rod" rctrlccr I
It nril dcvelopin3 couotricr
By emlyticd group
Net oil GrlrortcB
Nct oil in"prtcn
Mrjor exporterr ot
mrnufrcturcs
Iow.lnconc oountrica
Qbcr act oil ioportcrt r
By rcgion
A&ics
Asia
Europe
Middlc East
Wcttcnr Hcoisphcre
Re0o ol crtrmrl dcbt to GDP r
AII aoooil dcvclopial couotrics
By raalyticel group
Nct oil arportcn
Nct oil inrportcrs
Meior cxponers of
manufacturcs
Low-incoore countrics
Orhcr oct oil iorporters t
By redoo
Africa
Asia
Europc
Middlc Eest
lYestcra Hcmisphcre
Memoraadum itcms
X.etior (iacludiog Pcoglc's R,cp.
of Chior) r
To crDort:
All aonoil develoPint
countrics
Low-iocourc couoirics
To GDP:
AII uonoil ddvcloping
countrics
. Low-iacome countries
lls.a l(X.6 122.1 125.5 125.,t t30.2 I19.2 ll2.g 124.9 1l!.3 'rno.O
tt1.7
109.a
91.7
227.'
96.9
71.5 65.,f97.9 il.o102.4 n.tt45.4 105.21762 163.4
162.4 t69.5
t 15.,a I17.5
t03.0 103.1226.1 225.19t.3 ro4.l
t0.9 91.291.6 U.4t0t.0 I14.913t.5 137.5195.t 204.1
179.3 175.9
I r6.t l2l.t
99.5 l0r.t217.t 226.3lll.6 124.t
t03.1 tn.4E3.3 7?.7t27.1 t 6.1I'O.4 112.1lr4.l 21t.5
14,1.3 12t.1l14.l 109.J
r00.t 97.170.2 6t.2125.6 12t.6t33.t u3.l192.9 l7t.,l
29.1
22.t
2t.6
at.3
t03
30., 30.5r5.t rr.l
I l6.l
r52.0
2t.9
13.,1
21.6ll.t
96.9 9,1.0209.t 201.4
t r5.5 I10.9
t2r.9
100.9
tt6
2t1.5
tl.?
23.t 25.7 27.1 2t.5 27.5 27.6 3r.0 34.7 
'4.?
14.0 35.1 4.7 i13.526.3 29.7 t2.l 12.7
25.1 2rl t3.2 33.E23.6 21.7 26.2 26.510.6 3a:l t5.r !5.6
rt4.6 179.5 192.2ilt., lrt.l 134.3
100.5 [6.2 lt4.:23r.1 251.t 292..9lzlJ l3i0 t36.5
u9.9 t17.1 t48.672.5 t0.9 tJ.4
I lt.2 129.6 t?9.7
I 12.6 lr,l.3 133.1207.1 215.6 242.8
,s.2 35.t26.7 27.1
,1.? 
'4.550.3 17.4It.2 
't.5
22.1 2t.t
26.2 2s.52t.7 2t.2
20.2 19.620.1 !0.1t6.2 2t.2
l9-4 19.6t9.7 tt.921.5 zr.t35.2 34.023.0 z?.t
39.3 37.126.6 25.t
25.1 21.62..0 21.1
I l.J 2t.t
27.7
23.0
22.2
20.9
26.2
t2.t 3t.521.1 25.1
22.7 2t.921.1 21.927.7 2t.6
21.6 25.t20.1 22.127.t 24.639.0 12.325.5 26.1
2t.9 2t.t2L2 21.225.t 29.056.0 52.628.t 27.0
2t.4
23.4
25,7
15.1
2t.,0
21.9
1.L3
t27.O
170.0
109.4
tt7.7
24.t
13.2
30.6
25.2
33.t
51.3
3rJ
.:
I l9.t
r.o.0
n.t
14.3
t2t.6
169.0
116.5 t 7-7l.lt.? 155.5
Soruccs: World Beat. Ilbtor Leportiot Syrco: rod Fuod sufertiarrtcs ead proiccti<lc
I Excludcs date for tbc Pcoplc'r Rcpublic ol CLiar crccpt wbcrc ooted. For clessiftetioo of couotrir: in Sroups sbo*l berc, scc tbe
iatroductioo to thir appcodir.! Retio of ycer<od iiebt to cxpont or GDP for ycrr iadicelcL
r Middlc-iicoc countricr thei, in t:ocnt, crfit orinly pdErry coonoditisL
Ecqlcnric Ortl@k, p.201, Washingtcr rc 1983nma tfrfaEtcrn International I'trnetarlz
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Frcnr San Paolo t{ewsletter tib. 6, Septerdeli 1983, p.3.
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ln fhe period January-June 1983 lhe ECU conlirmed its rank as the third currency
ot Oenbmination lor new eurobond issues, after the U.S. dollar and the D.M.. rea'
ining . share ol more than 37o o_l-tF Eu.romarket. The amounl ol ECU bonds is'
sueo-tn the tirst six months ol 1983 is slightly superior to that registered in lhe
same petiod in 1982.
worlo Financial usrlcts. Augusl 1 9tts
NEW EUROBOND ISSUES
(new is_sues in Period,millffi
U.S $
D.M
ECU
CAN $
HFL
Other
1983
Uan.-June)
o/o 1982(Jan.-Jurnl.
olo A%
1983/1982
21,913
2.687
855
497
325
630
26.917
81.4
10.0
3.2
1.9
1.2
. 2.3
.100.0
26.137
1,163
751
970
367
7?6
30,114
86.8
3.9
2.5
3.2
1.2
2-4
100.0
-16.2+ 131 .0
+ 15.2
-48.8
-11.4
-13.2
-10.6
Motion for a Resotution (Doc. 1-10?318?) RNNEX VII
tabLed by llr Seeter, tilr Radoux and trtr Petikan
pursuant to Rute 47 of the Rutes of Procedure
on the externat trade of the Community and the probtem of global financiaL instabitity
ltre E\rropean Parliarrcnt, -'/
A regretting tlp irrreasirg trend tsdards prctectiqlisn in the rcrld
econcmy,
B disappointed by t}te results of the recent GATT ttinisterial Conference
in @neva,
C believing tl'at many of the pressures qr t}te GATI systsn stem frcrn
tle'*i&r break&nr of tlre internatiqral institutiqrs of tlre post-
war econcrnic settlenentr
D notfuq tlc furport,ilEe of widely flrctuating currency valrres on tle
terms of trade. with conseqrnces for inrrestnent &cisions 
€ud
econcnr.ic policy maldrtg,
E noting the difficulties posed for the financing of international
trade by tle rcrrd's carrrent riquiaity and banking problanrs,
F considering that the current levels of debt affecting certain of
tie newly industrialized corrntries (e.g. Irbrico, Brazil) inhibit ttrcm
frcrn assurning their full responsibilities,
G concerned at the prospect of countries engaging in ocnpetitive
&valuations to gain trade advantages,
H noting the protectionist pr&lenrs assciated both wittr a stnong US
dollar and an undenralued Japanese yen,
I. Calls upon the E\rropean Cqrmission to inrrestigate the inpact of
global financial instability on the ejcEernal tra& of the Corrmyrity;
2. Requests tle cqmd.ssion to report back to Parlianent as s@n as
possible on Uris matter witlt a vieu to a major poficy initiatirre
by tne Ccmnunity.
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